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INTRODUCTION

Significant advances in the field of medical technology now provide physicians with the ability to prolong life despite permanently
debilitating illnesses and what would have been fatal injuries. 1
1. Severns v. Wilmington Medical Center, 421 A.2d 1334, 1344 (Del. 1980). The Delaware Supreme Court appropriately articulated the problem of defining when life ends:
[W]e are on the threshold of new terrain-the penumbra where death begins, but
life, in some form, continues. We have been led to it by medical miracles which now
compel us to distinguish between "death," as we know it, and death in which the
body lives in some fashion, but the brain (or a significant part of it) does not.
Id. The President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine found that
nearly 80%7 of all deaths in America take place in a hospital or nursing home and most involved a decision by someone to do or not to do something which resulted in prolonging the
dying process. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE
AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE SUSTAINING TREATMENT: A REPORT OF THE ETHICAL, MEDICAL AND LEGAL ISSUES IN TREATMENT DECISIONS 16-18
(1983); see also D. CALLAHAN, SETrING LIMITS, MEDICAL GOALS IN AN AGING SoCIETY 52-81,

159-200 (1987) (questioning use of disproportionate share of medical resources to extend
lives of elderly patients with little focus on quality of life being prolonged); Lipton, Do-NotResuscitate Decisions in a Community Hospital. Incidence, Implications and Outcomes, 256 J. A.M.A.
1164, 1168 (1986) (finding 70%o of deaths follow decision to forgo life-sustaining treatment);
U.S. CONGRESS: OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT,

LIFE SUSTAINING TECHNOLOGIES AND

THE ELDERLY 41 (1987) (positing that timing of death is now matter of choice rather than fate).
In addition, advances in medical technology place physicians in a difficult situation when
their own decisions might conflict with those of the patient's family. See Meisel, Refusing Treatment, Refusing to Talk, and Refusing to Let Go: On Whose Terms Will Death Occur?, 17 LAW MED. &
HEALTH CARE 221, 223-26 (1989) (stating that some doctors would prefer not to know
whether patients want aggressive treatment because it may raise concerns about medical malpractice, medical ethics, or "mercy killing"); Note, I Have a Conscience, Too: The Plight of Medical
PersonnelConfronting the Right to Die, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 699, 716-30 (1990) (addressing.
medical professional's right to refrain from participating in decisions to withdraw treatment
for ethical reasons).
For a comprehensive analysis of the ethical, medical, and legal ramifications of medical
decisionmaking, see N. CANTOR, LEGAL FRONTIERS OF DEATH AND DYING (1987) [hereinafter
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Many state courts and legislatures have attempted to discern exactly
what rights apply to a patient whose life depends on the implementation or maintenance of medical treatment. 2 In the most clear-cut
LEGAL FRONTIERS]; J.K. MASON, HUMAN LIFE & MEDICAL PRACTICE (1988). For a compilation
of articles examining the definition of death, a myriad of euthanasia issues, and the decision to
forgo life-sustaining treatment, see G. LARUE, EUTHANASIA AND RELIGION, A SURVEY OF THE
ATrrrUDES OF WORLD RELIGIONS TO THE RIGHT-TO-DIE (1985);J. RACHELS, THE END OF LIFE:
EUTHANASIA AND MORALTY (1986); By No EXTRAORDINARY MEANS: THE CHOICE TO FORGO
LIFE-SUSTAINING FOOD & WATER (J. Lynn ed. 1986); DEATH, DYING, AND EUTHANASIA (D.
Horan & D. Mall eds. 1980); EUTHANASIA, THE MORAL ISSUES (R. Baird & S. Rosenbaum eds.
1989); EUTHANASIA AND THE RIGHT TO DEATH (A.B. Downing ed. 1969); NEW MEANINGS OF
DEATH (H. Feifel ed. 1977).
2. See infra notes 23-98 and accompanying text (discussing case law on incompetent
patients' right to die). At least 40 states and the District of Columbia now have living will laws
designed to permit individuals to execute a document to express their wishes regarding the
termination of medical treatment. Alabama Natural Death Act, ALA. CODE §§ 22-8a-I to -10
(1984); Alaska Rights of the Terminally Ill Act, ALASKA STAT. §§ 18.12.010 to .100 (1986);
Arizona Medical Treatment Decision Act, ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-3201 to -3210 (1986);
Arkansas Rights of the Terminally Ill or Permanently Unconscious Act, ARK. CODE ANN.
§§ 20-17-201 to -218 (Supp. 1989); California Natural Death Act, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE §§ 7185-7195 (West Supp. 1990); Colorado Medical Treatment Decision Act, COLO.
REV. STAT. §§ 15-18-101 to -113 (1989 & Supp. 1990); Connecticut Removal of Life Support
Systems Act, CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 19a-570 to -575 (Supp. 1990); Delaware Death with Dignity
Act, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, §§ 2501-2509 (1983); District of Columbia Natural Death Act of
1981, D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 6-2421 to -2430 (1989); Florida Life-Prolonging Procedure Act,
FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 765.01 to .15 (Supp. 1989); Georgia Living Wills Act, GA. CODE ANN.
§§ 31-32-1 to -12 (1985 & Supp. 1990); Hawaii Medical Treatment Decisions Act, HAWAII
REV. STAT. §§ 327D-1 to -27 (Supp. 1989); Idaho Natural Death Act, IDAHO CODE §§ 39-4502
to -4509 (1985 & Supp. 1990); Illinois Living Will Act, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, §§ 701710 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1990); Indiana Living Wills and Life-Prolonging Procedures Act, IND.
CODE. ANN. §§ 16-8-11-1 to -22 (Burns 1990); Iowa Life-Sustaining Procedures Act, IOWA
CODE ANN. §§ 144A.1 to .11 (1989); Kansas Natural Death Act, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-28,101
to -28,109 (1985); Louisiana Life-Sustaining Procedures Act, LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 40:1299.58.1 to .10 (West Supp. 1990); Maine Living Wills Act, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
18A, §§ 5-701 to -714 (Supp. 1990); Maryland Life-Sustaining Procedures Act, MD. HEALTHGEN. CODE ANN. 99 5-601 to -614 (Supp. 1990); Minnesota Adult Health Care Decisions Act,
MINN. STAT. §§ 145B.01 to .17 (Supp. 1991); Mississippi Withdrawal of Life-Saving Mechanisms Act, MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 41-41-101 to -121 (Supp. 1990); Missouri Life Support Declarations Act, Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 459.010 to .055 (Vernon Supp. 1990); Montana Living Will
Act, MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 50-9-102 to -104, -110, -201 to -206 (1990); Nevada Withholding
or Withdrawal of Life-Sustaining Procedures Act, NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 449.540 to .690 (1986 &
Supp. 1988); New Hampshire Terminal Care Document Act, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 137H:I to -H:16 (Supp. 1989); New Mexico Right to Die Act, N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-7-1 to -11
(1986); North Carolina Right to Natural Death Act, N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 90-320 to -323
(1990); Uniform Rights of the Terminally Ill Act, N.D. CENT. CODE 23-06.4-01 to -14 (Supp.
1989); Oklahoma Natural Death Act, OLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, §§ 3101-3111 (West Supp.
1991); Oregon Rights with Respect to Terminal Illness Act, OR. REV. STAT. §§ 97.050 to .090
(1984); South Carolina Death with Dignity Act, S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 44-77-10 to -160 (Law. Coop Supp. 1989); Tennessee Right to Natural Death Act, TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 32-1 1-101 to
-110 (1990); Texas Natural Death Act, TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art 4590h-1 (Vernon Supp.
.1991); Utah Personal Choice and Living Will Act, UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 75-2-1101 to -1118
(Supp. 1990); Vermont Terminal Care Document Act, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 5251-5262
and tit. 13 § 1801 (1987); Natural Death Act of Virginia, VA. CODE §§ 54.1-2981 to -2992
(1988 & Supp. 1990); Washington Natural Death Act, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 70.122.010
to .905 (Supp. 1990); West Virginia Natural Death Act, W. VA. CODE §§ 16-30-1 to -10
(1985); Wisconsin Natural Death Act, WIsc. STAT. ANN. §§ 154.01 to .15 (West 1989); Wyoming Act, Wyo. STAT. §§ 35-22-101 to -109 (1988); see also infra notes 101-17 and accompanying text (providing background of right-to-die legislation).
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cases, the issue focuses on whether a competent patient has the
right to terminate or to deny medical treatment.3 Despite some innovative "right to die" case law, jurists are not provided with4 a clear
basis for drawing the line for or against medical treatment.
Courts have recognized a competent patient's right to refuse
medical treatment based on an individual's common law right to refuse consent for treatment. 5 Courts have also upheld a patient's
right to refuse treatment based upon the right of privacy. 6 In Cruzan
3. Numerous state courts have held that a competent individual may refuse life-sustaining treatment. See, e.g., Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373
Mass. 728, 745, 370 N.E.2d 417, 427 (1977) (recognizing that general right of competent
persons to refuse treatment must also apply to incompetents in appropriate circumstances); In
re Farrell, 108 NJ. 335, 347, 529 A.2d 404, 410 (1987) (holding competent patient has right
to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment); In re Peter, 108 NJ. 365, 372, 529 A.2d 419, 423
(1987) (suggesting patient does not lose right to refuse medical treatment upon incompetency); In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 346-47, 486 A.2d 1209, 1222 (1985) (finding competent
adult generally has right to refuse initiation or continuance of medical treatment); In re Quinlan, 70 NJ. 10, 40, 355 A.2d 647, 663 (finding right of privacy encompasses patient's decision
to decline medical treatment in certain situations), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976); In re Westchester County Medical Center ex reL O'Connor, 72 N.Y.2d 517, 528, 531 N.E.2d 607, 611,
534 N.Y.S.2d 886, 890 (1988) (relating that common law has traditionally held that person
may decline life-sustaining treatment, absent overriding state interest); see also infra note 140
and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court's reiteration of competent patient's right
to refuse medical treatment).
4. See Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 737,
370 N.E.2d 417, 423 (1977) (suggesting courts consider medical ethics that influence doctors'
decisions on dealing with terminally ill patients); In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 345, 486 A.2d
1209, 1221 (1985) (stating that despite absence of clear legislative guidance on termination of
life-staining treatment, courts must not avoid issue merely because it is troubling or difficult).
A majority of citizens strongly believe that the right to make medical treatment decisions
includes the right to forgo life-sustaining treatment, including nutrition and hydration, and
that such choices are deeply personal and should remain within the family. See AMERICAN
MEDICAL AssOCIATION, PUBLIC OPINION ON HEALTH CARE-1986 (1986) (presenting results of
poll indicating 73% of those surveyed favored withdrawal of any life-sustaining procedures if
they or their family requested it); Collin, Planningand Drafting Durable Powers of Attorney for

501.3 to .8 (1988) (discussing changes in American
Health Care, 22 INST. ON EST. PLAN.
medical care, problems with medical decisionmaking in aging society, and development of
right-to-die movement).
5. See Schloendorffv. Society of New York Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 129-30, 105 N.E. 92,
93 (1914) (holding per Judge Cardozo that "[e]very human being of adult years and sound
mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body, and a surgeon who
performs an operation without his patient's consent commits an assault, for which he is liable
in damages").
The doctrine of informed consent is designed to respect an individual's right of self-determination in medical treatment matters and requires that physicians or other health care providers treat a patient only after having obtained the patient's consent. See Collin, supra note 4,
503.1 (C) (providing detailed analysis of doctrine of informed consent); Comment, The Right
to Die: An Exercise of Informed Consent, Not An Extension of the ConstitutionalRight to Privacy, 58 U.
CIN. L. REV. 1367, 1387-95 (1990) (concluding decision to refuse life-sustaining treatment

soundly supported by common law doctrine).
6. See In re Quinlan, 70 NJ. 10, 40, 355 A.2d 647, 663 (holding right of privacy, found
in penumbra emanating from specific guarantees of Bill of Rights and in article I, paragraph 1
of NewJersey Constitution broad enough to cover patient decisions), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922
(1976). The NewJersey Supreme Court is at the forefront of right-to-diejurisprudence. That
court's first decision in this area was Quinlan, in which the court permitted a father to exercise
his incompetent daughter's privacy right to withdraw treatment and to compel the hospital to
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v. Director, Missouri Department of Health,7 the United States Supreme

Court considered whether an incompetent individual possesses a
fundamental constitutional right to refuse life-prolonging procedures or to direct their withdrawal. 8 The Court concluded that an
incompetent patient does not have such a right.9 Absent clear and

convincing evidence that she would have refused life-prolonging
treatment if competent, Nancy Cruzan's parents could not compel
withdrawal of her life-support system.10 Cruzan offered the Court an
opportunity to expand the right of privacy to include the decision to
terminate medical treatment. The majority eschewed this path,
however, by deciding that Missouri's evidentiary requirement of
clear and convincing proof of intent as a prerequisite to withdrawing

or withholding an incompetent patient's medical treatment was not
unconstitutional. 11
This Note examines the approach of the United States Supreme
discontinue artificial respiration. Id at 41-42, 355 A.2d at 664. Other state courts have
adopted similar privacy rights. See Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160, 162 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1978) (recognizing right of privacy allows competent individual to refuse or discontinue treatment), aff'd, 379 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1980); Superintendent of Belchertown State School v.
Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 739-40, 370 N.E.2d 417, 424 (1977) (extending right of privacy to
refuse medical treatment to incompetent patient). For a discussion of the United States
Supreme Court's privacy cases see Mayo, Constitutionalizingthe "Right to Die", 49 MD. L. REv.
103, 111-25 (1990) (tracing early development of right of privacy through abortion cases and
noting that none establish right at issue in Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct.
2841 (1990)); Note, The Foundationsof the Right to Die, 90 W. VA. L. REV. 235, 239-59 (1987)
(outlining development of right to refuse medical treatment through common law, constitutional right of privacy, and statutory authority); see also infra notes 19-20 and accompanying
text (examining limitations on application of right of privacy to medical decisionmaking); infra
note 21 (providing additional state decisions recognizing right of privacy as foundation for
right to refuse treatment).
7. 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990).
8. Id. at 2846; see also Mayo, supra note 6, at 149-50 (listing broad range of issues
presented to Court in Cruzan).
9. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2852 (1990) (analyzing
"right to die" in terms of fourteenth amendment liberty interest and finding Missouri's
heightened evidentiary standards not violative of procedural due process). For an overview of
the existence of a constitutional right to die, see L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
§ 15-11, at 1362-71 (2d ed. 1988) (arguing that attributing rights to patients who are irreversibly comatose or in persistent vegetative state is problematic).
10. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2853. The clear and convincing standard of proof has been
defined as "proof sufficient to persuade the trier of fact that the patient held a firm and settled
commitment to the termination of life supports under the circumstances like those
presented." In re Westchester County Medical Center ex rel. O'Connor, 72 N.Y.2d 517, 531,
531 N.E.2d 607, 613, 534 N.Y.S.2d 886, 892 (1988). The NewJersey Supreme Court has held
that clear and convincing evidence is that which:
produce[s] in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of
the allegations sought to be established, evidence so clear, direct and weighty and
convincing as to enable [the factfinder] to come to a clear conviction, without hesitancy, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.
lit reJobes, 108 N.J. 394, 407-08, 529 A.2d 434, 441 (1987) (citation omitted); see also infra
notes 23-37 and accompanying text (discussing clear and convincing standard as applied by
New York courts in right-to-die cases).
11. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2852-53.
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Court in addressing the issue of an incompetent patient's right to
die. Part I traces the development of a patient's right to refuse
treatment based upon the common law right of bodily integrity and
the right of privacy. Part I also examines the analysis employed by
courts in New York and New Jersey to resolve medical treatment
decisions for incompetent patients, including application of the
"clear and convincing" and "substituted judgment" standards. Part
II briefly examines legislation affecting medical treatment decisions.
Part III reviews the Supreme Court's analysis in Cruzan, and Part IV
offers a constructive evaluation of the opinion. Finally, Part V proposes a basic framework of uniform requirements to protect the interest of individuals in refusing medical care. The Note concludes
with a recommendation that state legislatures establish clear guidelines for determining when an incompetent patient may have lifesustaining treatment withheld or withdrawn.
I.

DEVELOPMENT OF A GENERAL RIGHT To DISCONTINUE LIFESUSTAINING TREATMENT

A.

Background

Proponents of a "right to die" equate the individualized decision
to control medical treatment with the Supreme Court's articulation
of the right to self-determination.' 2 Self-determination entitles individuals to the possession and control of their bodies, and, therefore, supports the termination of medical treatment by recognizing
the choice of a competent individual to refuse unwanted treatment. 3 The right to self-determination and autonomy comes under
considerable scrutiny, however, when invoked on behalf of incompetent patients.' 4 Courts faced with protecting an incompetent patient's interests have taken two distinct approaches. Courts in
Maine, Missouri, and New York hold that absent a patient's in12. See Union Pacific Ry. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891) (holding that to force
plaintiff to undergo surgery would violate plaintiff's right to maintain bodily integrity). The
Botsford Court observed that no right is held more sacred or is more carefully guarded by the
common law than the right of individuals to possess and control their own persons. Id. This
right is free from restraint and the interference of others, subject only to clear and unquestionable authority of law. Id.; see also Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2846-47 (explaining that notion of
bodily integrity is embodied in notion of informed consent).
13. See In re Westchester County Medical Center ex rel. O'Connor, 72 N.Y.2d 517, 53940, 531 N.E.2d 607, 619, 534 N.Y.S.2d 886, 898 (1988) (Simons, J., dissenting) (examining
common law right of self-determination); see also supra note 5 (discussing common law doc-

trine of informed consent).
14. See Johnson, From Medicalizationto Legalization to Politicization: O'Connor, Cruzan, and
Refusal of Treatment in the 1990s, 21 CONN. L. REV. 685, 708-15 (1989) (discussing court challenges to appropriateness of right of self-determination as applied to incompetent patients);
see also infra notes 180-83 and accompanying text (evaluating problems inherent in applying
autonomy concept to incompetent patients).
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formed refusal of medical treatment, the state's interest in preserving life prevails. 1 5 Other courts, however, evaluate an incompetent
patient's value system and general pattern of beliefs.' 6 The latter,
"substituted judgment" approach, attempts to determine whether
the patient, if competent, would have decided to implement, main17
tain, or terminate life-sustaining treatment.
Generally, the Supreme Court has placed limits on state intrusion
into the basic areas of personal liberty, family privacy, and bodily
integrity.' 8 Nevertheless, the right of privacy, as recognized by the
Court in Griswold v. Connecticut,' 9 has only limited application in
15. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2846, 2855 (1990)
(affirming Missouri Supreme Court finding that informal statements to friend are not suffident to meet clear and convincing standard); In re Gardner, 534 A.2d 947, 953 (Me. 1987)
(applying clear and convincing standard of proof to establish that patient declared intent and
desire to discontinue treatment in advance); In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 379, 420 N.E.2d 64,
72, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, 274 (1981) (requiring clear and convincing evidence of patient's
wishes); see also Note, An Incompetent Individual's Right to Die, 17 FORDHAM URB. LJ. 303, 307-22
(1989) (examining New York's subjective intent requirement).
16. See In reJobes, 108 NJ. 394, 414-20, 529 A.2d 434,444-47 (1987) (discussing factors
to consider when applying substituted judgment to protect incompetent patient's rights), In re
Conroy, 98 NJ. 321, 360-66, 486 A.2d 1209, 1229-32 (1985) (providing guidelines for evalu-

ating subjective and objective factors in order to best effectuate surrogate decision on behalf
of incompetent patients); see also infra notes 38-98 (tracing development and application of
substituted judgment standard as reflected in New Jersey case law).
17. Jobes, 108 NJ. at 414-20, 529 A.2d at 444-47 (adding that substituted judgment approach ensures that surrogate decisionmaker effectuates decision patient would make if competent). The NewJersey Supreme Court has effectively developed the subtituted judgment
evaluation to protect an incompetent patient's right to refuse medical treatment. See Weinberg, Whose Right Is It Anyway? Individualism, Community, and the Right to Die: A Commentary on the
New Jersey Experience, 40 HASTINGS LJ. 119, 132-53 (1988) (tracing evolution of New Jersey
caselaw).

18. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (holding criminal law
prohibiting use or aiding and abetting use of contraceptives violates constitutional right of
privacy); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952) (finding police conduct in attempting
to extract suspect's stomach contents "shocks the conscience" under due process); Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541-43 (1942) (prohibiting state, on equal protection grounds, from
sterilizing convicts); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923) (recognizing right of parents to control their children's education as liberty interest).
19. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). No right of privacy is specifically guaranteed in the Constitution. See id. at 495 (noting that Constitution does not speak in so many words of the right of
privacy); see also Coleman, Creating Therapist-IncestOffender Exception to Mandatory Child Abuse Reporting Status-When PsychiatristKnows Best, 54 U. CIN. L. REv. 1113, 1116 n.15 (1986) (recog-

nizing lack of specific constitutional provision guaranteeing right of privacy, but finding
individual's interest in preventing disclosure of psychiatric records protected by penumbra of
various rights); Fletcher, Principlist Models in the Analysis of Constitutionaland Statutory Texts, 72
IOWA L. REv. 891, 905-09 (1987) (discussing distortions in constitutional interpretation exem-

plified by right to privacy when no specific constitutional provision directly endorses it). The
Court in Griswold, however, perJustice Douglas, found a constitutional zone of privacy within
the penumbra and emanations of the first, third, fourth, fifth, and ninth amendments to the
Constitution. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484. Justice Goldberg cited the ninth amendment as a
specific recognition that not all rights protected by the Constitution are specifically enumerated. Id. at 487 (Goldberg,J., concurring). Justice Harlan contended that the right to marital
privacy was implicit in the concept of ordered liberty. Id. at 500 (Harlan, J., concurring) (citing Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
Judicial recognition of an expanded right of sexual privacy came in Eisenstadt v. Baird, when
the Court struck down a Massachusetts statute prohibiting the distribution of contraceptives
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other areas of personal decisionmaking. The Court has thus far rejected efforts to extend the privacy right protecting contraception
and abortion choices to sexual privacy or matters of personal autonomy. 20 Prior to Cruzan, the Supreme Court had never addressed the
issue of whether the right of privacy extends to the termination of
life-sustaining medical treatment.2 1 The Court's general reluctance
to unmarried persons as violative of the fourteenth amendment guarantee of equal protection. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438,447 (1972). Justice Brennan, writing for the majority,
held that the equal protection clause prohibited states from discriminating between married
and unmarried persons. Id. Moreover, the distinction did not relate sufficiently to the state's
objective of discouraging premarital intercourse. Id. at 449-50.
In Roe v. Wade, the Court overruled a Texas law prohibiting abortion except to save the life
of the mother. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 166-67 (1973). The Court, perJustice Blackmun,
concluded that the constitutional right of privacy was broad enough to encompass a woman's
decision to terminate her pregnancy. IA at 129-53 (surveying history of abortion and development of right of privacy). A decade later, the Court reaffirmed the principles of Roe and
refused to adopt an approach that would limit the application of strict scrutiny to state regulations which unduly burdened fundamental rights. Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive
Health, 462 U.S. 416, 420 & n.1 (1982) (finding Akron city ordinance unconstitutional in
limiting second trimester hospital procedures by requiring parental consent, requiring informed consent, imposing 24-hour waiting period, and dictating procedures for disposal of
fetal remains). But see id at 453 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (proposing Court adopt "undue
burden" standard to determine whether state regulation unduly burdens woman's right to
abortion regardless of stage of pregnancy). More recently, in Webster v. Reproductive Health
Services, the Supreme Court upheld a Missouri statute that regulated the performance of abortions. Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 109 S. Ct. 3040, 3046 (1989). In a plurality
opinion, joined by Justices White and Kennedy, ChiefJustice Rehnquist noted that Griswold,
unlike Roe, did not adopt a rigid framework of rules and distinctions to deal with areas of
medical practice traditionally subject to state regulation. Id at 3045. The plurality questioned Roe's characterization of abortion as a fundamental right. Id. at 3058. The Webster
plurality, by contrast, depicted abortion merely as a liberty interest protected by the due process clause. Id.
20. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 188 n.2, 190-92 (1986) (rejecting suggested
fundamental right to engage in consensual homosexual sodomy). In Hardwick, Justice White,
writing for the majority, recognized that the Court's prior privacy decisions protected matters
involving family, marriage, and procreation, but rejected any connection between those rights
and the proposed right at issue in Hardwick. Id. at 190-91; see also Kelley v.Johnson, 425 U.S.
238, 248-49 (1976) (rejecting effort to extend right of privacy to police hair-length regulation). The Supreme Court has never held that there is a constitutionally guaranteed right to
live a particular lifestyle. See generally Wilkinson & White, ConstitutionalProtectionfor Personal
Lifestyles, 62 CORNELL L. REv. 563 (1977) (examining constitutional treatment of governmental

intrusion into personal preferences of domestic companionship, sexual conduct, hair style,
and dress).
21. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2851 (1990) (recognizing
Cruzan as first case to squarely present Court with "right to die" issue). Nevertheless, state
courts have held or recognized that a constitutional right of privacy was a foundation for the
right of a patient to forgo life-sustaining treatment. See, e.g., Foody v. Manchester Memorial
Hosp., 40 Conn. Supp. 127, 132, 482 A.2d 713, 717 (1984) (finding penumbral right of privacy encompasses right of patient to be free from unwanted infringements of bodily integrity);
In re Severns, 425 A.2d 156, 158-59 (Del. Ch. 1980) (finding right of incompetent person to
choose, through guardian, to have artificial support discontinued is grounded in constitutional right of privacy); Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160, 162 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978)
(recognizing constitutional right of privacy encompasses competent patient's choice to discontinue respirator), aff'd, 379 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1980); Superintendent of Belchertown State
School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 739-40, 370 N.E.2d 417, 424 (1977) (stating guardian
may assert incompetent patient's right of privacy against unwanted infringements of bodily
integrity); Lane v. Candura, 6 Mass. App. 377, 378-79, 376 N.E.2d 1232, 1233 (1978) (hold-
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toward extending the constitutional right of privacy in earlier cases
22
suggested that it would not do so in Cruzan.
B.

In re Storar and the "Clear and Convincing" Standard

Courts at the forefront of medical treatment issues have established different standards for protecting individual interests. In the
consolidated appeals of In re Storar2 s and In re Eichner,24 the New
York Court of Appeals considered the rights of incompetent patients whose guardians desired to stop life-sustaining medical treatment. The court required clear and convincing proof of an
incompetent person's prior instructions to withhold or withdraw
25
life-sustaining procedures.
ing woman's constitutional right of privacy entitled her to refuse consent to amputate gangrenous limb); In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 38-41, 51, 355 A.2d 647, 662-64, 669 (tracing
development of right of privacy and recognizing it as support for permitting termination of
medical treatment in certain circumstances), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976); In re Quackenbush, 156 N.J. Super. 282, 290, 383 A.2d 785, 789-90 (Prob. Div. 1978) (upholding patient's
refusal to consent to operation to remove gangrenous limb supported by individual right of
privacy); Suenram v. Society of the Valley Hosp., 155 N.J. Super. 593, 601-03, 383 A.2d 143,
148 (Law Div. 1977) (indicating individual right of privacy encompasses right to choose or
reject cancer treatment on advice of physician); In re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d 114, 119-22, 660
P.2d 738, 741-43 (1983) (holding incurably and terminally ill incompetent adult has constitutional right of privacy to refuse treatment that merely prolongs dying process).
22. See Mayo, supra note 6, at 126-33 (evaluating Court's reluctant forays into fundamental rights analyses); see also infra notes 140, 174-78 and accompanying text (discussing and
evaluating majority opinion in Cruzan as characterizing right to die issue in terms of protected
liberty interest).
23. 106 Misc. 2d 880, 433 N.Y.S.2d 388 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 78 A.D.2d 1013, 434 N.Y.S.2d
46 (1980), rev'd sub nom. Soper v. Storar (In re Storar), 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438
N.Y.S.2d 266, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981).
24. 102 Misc. 2d 184, 423 N.Y.S.2d 580 (Sup. Ct. 1979), aff'd sub nom. Eichner v. Dillon,
73 A.2d 431, 426 N.Y.S.2d 517 (1980), modified sub nom. Soper v. Storar (In re Storar), 52
N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981).
25. In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 379, 420 N.E.2d 64, 72, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, 274, cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981). See generally Note, A Patient's Last Rights-Termination of Medical
Care-An Analysis of New York 's In re Storar, 46 ALB. L. REV. 1380 (1982) (reviewing Eichner and
Storar decisions and criticizing court for failing to set forth guidelines supporting termination
of life-prolonging treatment on behalf of incompetent patients).
The consolidated appeals in In re Storar addressed two sets of circumstances: one involving
an individual who, while competent, made prior statements concerning his health care, and
one involving a mentally handicapped individual who was never competent to consider health
care decisions. Storar, 52 N.Y.2d at 370-75, 420 N.E.2d at 67-70, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 269-72
(providing history of Storar's medical problems). The Eichnerappeal involved an 83-year-old
patient maintained by a respirator in a persistent vegetative state. Id. at 370-71, 420 N.E.2d at
67, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 269. Brother Fox, a long-time member of a Catholic religious order
suffered cardiac arrest while undergoing routine surgery. Id. The resulting loss of oxygen to
Fox's brain caused severe and irreversible brain damage. Id. at 371, 420 N.E.2d at 67, 438
N.Y.S.2d at 269. Father Eichner, as Fox's guardian, sought to have the hospital remove the
respirator. Id.
In the lower court proceedings, evidence suggested that before the operation, and while
competent, Fox stated that under similar circumstances he would want a respirator removed.
Id. at 371-72, 420 N.E.2d at 67-68, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 269-70. Both the New York Supreme
Court and Appellate Division concluded that evidence presented in Fox's behalf clearly established that, if competent, he would have wanted treatment stopped. Id. at 372, 420 N.E.2d at
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The court declined to address whether the right of privacy encompassed a patient's control of the course of medical treatment. 26
Instead, the majority relied on common law principles respecting
the right of competent patients to refuse consent for medical treatment. 27 The court concluded that proof consisting of instructions
left by a previously competent person to terminate treatment procedures must be clear and convincing. 28 Under this standard, prior
directives based merely upon casual or cursory statements concerning medical treatment would be insufficient proof.2 9
Although the court in Storar failed to expand upon the showing
30
necessary to satisfy the dear and convincing evidentiary burden,
the same court later addressed this issue in In re Westchester County
68, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 270. The New York Court of Appeals agreed, but the court modified the
elaborate procedural requirements established by the Appellate Division. Id at 376-80, 420
N.E.2d at 70-72, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 273-74.
The Storar appeal involved a proceeding, initiated by the director of a development center,
to continue blood transfusions to an incompetent patient. Id at 373, 420 N.E.2d at 68, 438
N.Y.S.2d at 270. The patient's mother had requested that the blood transfusions to her terminally ill son be stopped. Id Her son, profoundly retarded since birth, was diagnosed with
terminal bladder cancer. Id Treatment required blood transfusions, but, even with the transfusions, Storar would ultimately have died of the disease. Id
The Appellate Division determined that individuals have the right to control what will be
done with their bodies, and, when a person is incompetent, this right may be exercised by
another in the incompetent person's behalf. See id. at 375-76, 420 N.E.2d at 70, 438 N.Y.S.2d
at 272 (affirming New York Supreme Court decision). The New York Court of Appeals,
adopting a clear and convincing evidence standard, reversed. Id. at 382-83, 420 N.E.2d at 7374, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 275-76 (concluding permission to continue transfusions should be
granted).
26. Id. at 376-77, 420 N.E.2d at 70, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 272-73 (distinguishing other decisions finding medical decisionmaking protected by right of privacy).
27. Ia In Eichner, however, the court declined to decide if a substituted decision to forgo
life-sustaining treatment may be exercised because the patient had clearly made the decision
to terminate treatment while competent. l at 379, 420 N.E.2d at 72, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 274; see
also supra note 5 and accompanying text (discussing common law doctrine of informed
consent).
28. In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 379, 420 N.E.2d 64, 72, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, 274, cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981).
29. See id at 379-80, 420 N.E.2d at 72, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 274 (explaining that loose, equivocal or contradictory evidence would not suffice). In the Eichner appeal, the court concluded
that under this standard, the patient clearly understood the consequences of his statements,
and his statements were consistent with his beliefs and life of religious devotion. Id. Moreover, the patient's reiteration of his decision shortly before hospitalization supported the seriousness of his statements. Ia In the Storar appeal, the patient was never competent. Id. at
373, 420 N.E.2d at 68, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 270. For such individuals, every medical decision
must be made by another. See generally LEGAL FROrNTERS, supra note 1, at 58-82 (analyzing

problems in decisionmaking criteria for incompetent patients). The court stated that the facts
in Storar bear only superficial similarity to Eichner and thus the decision should turn on different principles. Storar, 52 N.Y.2d at 380, 420 N.E.2d at 73, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 275. The New
York Court of Appeals held, therefore, that it would be unrealistic to attempt to discern
whether a life-long incompetent individual would stop treatment if he were competent. Id. at
380, 420 N.E.2d at 72, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 275.
30. In Eichner, Brother Fox left unquestionably clear instructions as to his wishes. Id. at
371-72, 420 N.E.2d at 68, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 270. In Storar, however, the court doubted that a
never-competent individual could ever establish an opinion concerning termination of treatment. Id. at 379-80, 420 N.E.2d at 72,438 N.Y.S.2d at 274. The court, therefore, avoided the
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Medical Center ex rel. O'Connor.31 In O'Connor, the court held that an
individual should not be denied essential medical care absent that
person's express intent to decline treatment. 3 2 Specifically, the
clear and convincing standard required proof that an incompetent
person had made a previous firm commitment to a decision to terminate life-support.3 3 The persistence and seriousness of past statements are factors considered in evaluating the patient's
commitment. 3 4 The majority revealed some reluctance to authorize
treatment decisions based upon prior statements. 3 5 The court suggested that a possibility always exists that patients might change
their minds after making a statement, or that past statements were
made without appropriate reflection about the consequences. 36
Nevertheless, the court determined that these subjective problems
did not require abandoning the clear and convincing standard in
favor of an objective substituted judgment approach.3 7
need to elaborate on the clear and convincing standard although the majority of cases are not
as clear.
31. 72 N.Y.2d 517, 531 N.E.2d 607, 534 N.Y.S.2d 886 (1988). Mary O'Connor, a 77year-old widow, sustained serious brain damage and related disabilities after a series of
strokes. Id at 523, 531 N.E.2d at 608, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 887. O'Connor could not swallow and
was unable to care for herself. Id at 523-24, 531 N.E.2d at 608-09, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 887-88.
Her condition continued to deteriorate and her physician determined that a nasogastric tube
should be inserted to increase her intake of nourishment. Id. at 524, 531 N.E.2d at 609, 534
N.Y.S.2d at 888. O'Connor's daughters objected to the hospital's attempts to insert a nasogastric tube. Id. When the hospital sought to compel the treatment, the daughters claimed
such action would be against their mother's expressed wishes. Id. O'Connor's daughters and
a third witness recounted times when she had discussed how patients should not be kept alive
by machines when there was no hope of recovery. Id. at 526-27, 531 N.E.2d at 610-11, 534
N.Y.S.2d at 889-90. Despite O'Connor's past concern about prolonged medical treatment, all
agreed she had never discussed her thoughts on the artificial provision of food and water, or
the refusal of medical treatment in a situation that would cause a painful death. Id. at 527,
531 N.E.2d at 611, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 890.
32. Id at 530-31, 531 N.E.2d at 613, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 892 (citing In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d
363, 379, 420 N.E.2d 64, 72, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, 274, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981)). The
court determined that O'Connor's past statements did not amount to clear and convincing
evidence of her choice to terminate treatment under these circumstances, Id. at 532-34, 531
N.E.2d at 614-15, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 893-94.
33. Id. at 531, 531 N.E.2d at 613, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 892; see also supra note 10 (providing
general definition of clear and convincing standard).
34. Ex reL O'Connor, 72 N.Y.2d at 531, 531 N.E.2d at 613, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 892.
Although O'Connor made many statements concerning termination of medical treatment, the
court held they were insufficient to meet the clear and convincing standard. Id. at 534, 531
N.E.2d at 615, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 894. The court reasoned that it would be highly speculative to
consider O'Connor's statements anything more than immediate reactions to the unsettling
experience of caring for her relatives. Id at 532, 531 N.E.2d at 614, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 893.
O'Connor's daughters undoubtedly knew her wishes better than anyone, but O'Connor's
statements alone did not establish the seriousness of purpose required to satisfy the evidentiary burden. Id. at 532-34, 531 N.E.2d at 614-15, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 893-94.
35. See id. (suggesting any error should be made on side of sustaining life).
36. Id
37. Id. at 530, 531 N.E.2d at 613, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 891 (rejecting latter approach as unacceptable because of inconsistency with commitment to notion that no person or court should
substitute its judgment as to acceptable quality of life of another) (citation omitted). Simi-
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C. The New Jersey Supreme Court: In re Quinlan, the Right of Privacy,
and SubstitutedJudgment
The New Jersey Supreme Court began to craft a significant body
of law involving an incompetent patient's right to terminate treatment in In re Quinlan.3 8 The court concluded in Quinlan that the
right of privacy is broad enough to encompass medical treatment
decisions and, in certain circumstances, supersedes the state's interest in the preservation of human life.39 Nine years later, in In re
Conroy,40 the New Jersey Supreme Court reestablished that the right
of privacy is not lost upon incompetency, and set forth procedures
to decide when an incompetent individual's right to forgo medical
treatment may be exercised by a surrogate decisionmaker. 4 1 In In re
Farrell,4 2 In re Peter,4 3 and In reJobes,44 the same court refined its application of the substituted judgment doctrine and applied it in
45
three distinct treatment situations.
1.

The case of Karen Ann Quinlan

In Quinlan, the NewJersey Supreme Court unanimously held that
the right of privacy articulated by the United States Supreme Court
presumably was broad enough to encompass a patient's decision to
decline medical treatment. 4 6 The court recognized that the state relarly, other courts have declined to follow an objective approach to substituted judgment. See
Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 749-51, 370 N.E.2d
417, 429-31 (1977) (preferring subjective inquiry into intent of particular patient to objective
assessment of what majority of people would do in similar circumstances).
38. 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976). For a detailed discussion
of the Karen Ann Quinlan case, seeJ. QUINLAN &J. QUINLAN WITH P. BATrELLE, KAREN ANN,
THE QUINLANS TELL THEIR STORY (1977).

39. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 40, 355 A.2d 647, 663-64, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
40. 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985).
41. See infra notes 55-73 and accompanying text (discussing Conroy).
42. 108 NJ. 335, 529 A.2d 404 (1987).
43. 108 N.J. 365, 529 A.2d 419 (1987).
44. 108 NJ. 394, 529 A.2d 434 (1987).
45.

See infra notes 76-98 and accompanying text (discussing Farrell,Peter, andJobes).

46. In re Quinlan, 70 NJ. 10, 40, 355 A.2d 647, 663 (tracing this conclusion back to
Griswold and Roe v. Wade), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976); see also supra notes 18-22 and accompanying text (examining right of privacy). Karen Ann Quinlan stopped breathing for an
extended period of time. Quinlan, 70 NJ. at 22-34, 355 A.2d at 653-60 (providing background of Quinlan's medical problems). The resulting loss of oxygen to her brain caused her
to slip into what is considered a persistent vegetative state. Id. at 24, 355 A.2d at 654. Quinlan's father sought to be appointed guardian "of the person and property of his daughter,"
and expressly requested that the letters of guardianship authorize the discontinuance of all
extraordinary medical procedures. Id. at 18, 355 A.2d at 651. The Superior Court denied Mr.
Quinlan authorization to terminate the life-support system. In re Quinlan, 137 NJ. Super.
227, 266, 348 A.2d 801, 824 (Ch. Div. 1975). Mr. Quinlan's appeal and the cross-appeal by
the Attorney General of NewJersey presented the court with two issues: (1) whether the right
of privacy extends to choices involving medical treatment, and (2) whether an incompetent's

right of choice may be asserted on her behalf. Quinlan, 70 NJ. at 40-42, 355 A.2d at 663-64.
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tains an interest in the preservation and sanctity of human life.4 7

The court concluded, however, that the state's interests wane and an
individual's right of privacy grows as the degree of bodily intrusion

increases and the likelihood of recovery diminishes. 48 A patient's
49
right to choose is normally based on the competency to assert it.
With incompetent patients, however, no means exist by which they
may independently exercise the right to terminate treatment.50 The
New Jersey Supreme Court concluded that, under these circumstances, Quinlan's right of privacy could be asserted on her behalf
by her guardian. 51
Additionally, the court in Quinlan addressed whether the court
should resolve issues when provided with minimal pre-existing legislative guidance. 52 The opinion stressed that courts have the power
"to protect those under disability," and, as such, may impose particular medical decisions by applying the doctrine of substituted judgment. 53 The New Jersey Supreme Court refused, however, to
a deciendorse a general practice of enlisting the court to validate
54
patient.
a
from
treatment
life-sustaining
sion to withdraw
2.

The case of Clair C. Conroy

As did the New York Court of Appeals' decision in Storar, the New
Jersey Supreme Court, in Quinlan, took an approach toward medical
treatment decisions for incompetent patients that did not provide
clear guidance for applying the standard to other individuals. The
New Jersey Supreme Court clarified its position in In re Conroy.55
The court in Conroy articulated both substantive and procedural
guidelines to be followed in deciding whether to allow withholding
or withdrawal of treatment from incompetent nursing home pa47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 40, 355 A.2d at 663.
Id. at 41, 355 A.2d at 664.
Id.
Id.
Id
Id at 42-51, 355 A.2d at 664-69 (noting paucity ofjudicial or legislative guidance

and evaluating decision in light of prevailing medical standards).
53. Id at 44, 355 A.2d at 666 (citing Hart v. Brown, 29 Conn. Supp. 368, 369-71, 37678, 289 A.2d 386, 387-88, 390-91 (Sup. Ct. 1972) (permitting parents to authorize kidney
donation from one seven-year-old identical twin to the other) and Strunk v. Strunk, 445
S.W.2d 145, 147-48 (Ky. 1969) (allowing mother to authorize removal of kidney from incompetent son for benefit of other son)).
54. See id at 46-51, 355 A.2d at 666-69 (warning that court should not encroach upon
medical practice).
55. 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985); see Note, In re Conroy: ForgingA Path to Death
With Dignity, 67 B.U.L. REv. 365, 373-88 (1987) (evaluating the Conroy decision and concluding that best interest test fails, however, to resolve properly all major issues inherent in termination of life-sustaining treatment on behalf of incompetent patients).
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tients. 56 The court expanded the situations in which withdrawal or
withholding of life-sustaining treatment could be authorized for
nursing home patients. 5 7 In addition, the court determined that
Quinlan applied only to patients in a "chronic, persistent vegetative
or comatose state." 5 8 Accordingly, the Conroy court enunciated
standards by which an incompetent individual, although not in a
persistent vegetative state such as Karen Quinlan, may exercise a
right to self-determination. 59 These standards attempt to best effec56. Claire Conroy was an 84-year-old nursing home patient with serious and irreversible
physical and mental impairments. In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 335-42, 486 A.2d 1209, 1216-19
(1985) (describing Claire Conroy's medical condition and likelihood of short lifespan). Conroy received nutrition through a nasogastric tube; removal of the tube would cause her to die
within one week. Id. at 338, 486 A.2d at 1217. Conroy's guardian had refused to consent to a
prior operation and now sought permission to remove the nasogastric tube, because, in his
opinion, Conroy "would not have allowed [the nasogastric tube] to be inserted in the first
place." Id at 340, 486 A.2d at 1218. The doctors' opinions were divided regarding whether
it was an appropriate medical practice to remove the tube. Id at 338-39, 486 A.2d at 1217.
One physician did not consider it acceptable medical practice to remove the tube, yet another
stated that if he were the treating physician, and the case had not gone to court, he would
have removed the tube with the consent of Conroy's family. Id at 339, 486 A.2d at 1217-18.
The trial court determined that the tube could be removed. In re Conroy, 188 N.J. Super.
523, 529-30, 457 A.2d 1232, 1236 (Ch. Div. 1983). The lower court reasoned that the inquiry
should focus on determining whether Conroy's life had become "impossibly burdensome."
Id at 528, 457 A.2d at 1235. The court noted that removal of the tube would lead to starvation within several days and acknowledged that it might be painful. Id. at 529-30, 457 A.2d at
1236. The court justified removal, however, based on Conroy's severely limited intellectual
capacity and the possibility that in her condition she may not feel pain. Id
The NewJersey Appellate Division reversed, concluding that the ultimate issue was whether
Conroy's right of privacy outweighed the State's interest in preserving life. In re Conroy, 190
N.J. Super. 453, 460, 464 A.2d 303, 306-07 (App. Div. 1983). Although Conroy died pending
appeal, the Appellate Division heard the case because cases of this type were "capable of
repetition yet evading review." Id. at 459-60, 464 A.2d at 306 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113, 124-25 (1973) (stating pregnancy provides classic justification for non-mootness)).
The court limited the right to terminate life-sustaining treatment, based upon a guardian's
judgment, to incurably and terminally ill patients who were brain dead, irreversibly comatose,
or in a persistent vegetative state and thus not able to benefit from further medical treatment.
Conroy, 190 N.J. Super. at 460, 464 A.2d at 310 (requiring also that patient gain no medical
benefits from continued treatment). As an alternative basis for reversing the trial court, the
Appellate Division distinguished withholding nourishment from other forms of medical treatment. Id. But see infra notes 151, 193-95, 212 and accompanying text (providing conclusions
of Cruzan and other authorities that no such distinction may be maintained). Thus, the court
equated withdrawal of the nasogastric tube to depriving Conroy of the necessities of life.
Conroy, 190 N.J. Super. at 475, 464 A.2d at 312. Such action would be tantamount to active
euthanasia and, therefore, ethically impermissible. Id. Subsequently the NewJersey Supreme
Court granted Conroy's guardian's petition for certification. In re Conroy, 95 NJ. 195, 470
A.2d 418 (1983).
57. In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 328, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985). Although the court recognized
both common law and constitutional support for an individual's right to decline medical treatment, the court declined to decide whether the right of privacy extended to this case. Id.
Instead, the court relied on the common law right to self-determination as the basis for a
qualified right to decline life-sustaining treatment. Id. at 347-48, 486 A.2d at 1223 (citing
Storar as example of court declining to reach constitutional issue where decision was appropriately based upon common law principles).
58. Conroy, 98 NJ. 321, 358-59, 486 A.2d 1209, 1228 (1985); see also In re Peter, 108 NJ.
365, 376, 529 A.2d 419, 425 (1987) (regarding Quinlan decision as appropriate guide only
when patient in persistent vegetative state).
59. Specifically, the court addressed cases involving formerly competent nursing home
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tuate the choice the individual would have made in this situation. 60
a.

The subjective test

A decisionmaker for an incompetent individual must seek to
reach, to the extent possible, the decision that the individual would
have made if competent. 6' To enable a surrogate decisionmaker to
exercise the right to withhold or withdraw medical treatment, the
court in Conroy formulated a subjective test that focuses solely on
determining whether the particular patient, if competent, would
have refused treatment. 62 To satisfy the test, an individual must
have unequivocally expressed an intent to forgo future life-sustaining intervention. 6 3 Absent clear proof of a patient's prior
choice, no court, doctor, or relative may cite the patient's right to
64
self-determination as justification for a substituted judgment.
b.

The limited-objective and pure-objective tests

The court in Conroy did not foreclose the possibility of withholding or withdrawing life-sustaining treatment from incompetent individuals suffering from painful and terminal illnesses who had never
expressed their intentions. 6 5 Through the state's parens patriae
power, courts may allow decisions to be made on behalf of an incompetent person despite the absence of any prior directives. 66 Acresidents who, unlike Karen Quinlan, remained conscious, but whose mental and physical
capacities were seriously impaired, and whose life expectancy was relatively short. See Conroy,
98 N.J. at 358-59, 486 A.2d at 1228-29. Despite these limitations, the standards presented in
Conroy provide a basis for the law applied later by the New Jersey Supreme Court in In re
Farrell, In re Peter, and In reJobes. See infra notes 76-98 and accompanying text (discussing
these cases).
60.

See LEGAL FRONTIERS, supra note 1, at 68-76 (discussing standards whereby medical

treatment decisions may be designed to best reflect the interests of incompetent patients).
61. In re Conroy, 98 NJ. 321, 360-61, 486 A.2d 1209, 1229 (1985); see LEGAL FRONTIERS,
supra note 1, at 63-67 (discussing substituted judgment approach and Conroy subjective test).
62. In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 360-61, 486 A.2d 1209, 1229 (1985).
63. See id. at 361-62, 486 A.2d at 1229-30 (defining evidence of expression sufficient to
satisfy subjective test). The court elaborated upon several types of evidence which would
exhibit clear intent under its subjective test: a written document such as a living will; oral
directives to a relative, friend, or health care provider; a durable power of attorney or health
care proxy authorizing another to make decisions on the patient's behalf should the patient
become incompetent; a person's religious beliefs; and a patient's consistent prior conduct
with regard to medical decisions. Id.
64. Id. at 364, 486 A.2d at 1231 (citing In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 378-80, 420 N.E.2d
64, 72-73, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, 274-75, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981)).
65. Id.
66. Id. at 364-65, 486 A.2d at 1231. The parens patriaedoctrine is an equitable concept
under which courts or the state may exercise power to protect the welfare of those unable to
do so themselves. See Custer, The Origins of the Doctrine of Parens Patriae, 27 EMORY L. REV.
195, 195-96 (1978) (tracingparens patriaedoctrine to English 13th-century wardship over "all
natural fools and idiots"); see also Weinberg, supra note 17, at 125-30 (analyzing best interests
standards, self-determination, and parens patriae doctrine).
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cordingly, the court in Conroy concluded that the state may
terminate or deny life-sustaining treatment if either of two "best67
interest" tests are satisfied.
Under the limited-objective test, if patients leave some "trustworthy" evidence that they would have refused treatment, the substitute
decisionmaker may withdraw life-sustaining treatment if the burdens imposed upon the patient outweigh the benefits. 68 The pureobjective test applies when there is insufficient trustworthy evidence
of an incompetent patient's wishes. 69 The pure-objective test allows
withdrawal of treatment only if "the net burdens of the patient's life
with the treatment . . . clearly and markedly outweigh the benefits
that the patient derives from life" or if continued treatment would
'70
be "inhumane."
In sum, the subjective test mandates clear proof that the incompe71
tent patient would choose to refuse treatment if able to do so.
The limited-objective test is met when some trustworthy evidence
exists to show that the patient would have refused treatment, and
where the burden of the patient's pain and suffering outweigh the
benefits of continued life.7 2 Finally, the pure-objective test is satisfied when no evidence supporting the patient's treatment decision
exists, but the effect of directing or continuing treatment would be
inhumane due to severe and unavoidable pain. 73 In each of these
67. In re Conroy, 98 NJ. 321, 365, 486 A.2d 1209, 1232 (1985).
68. Id. (permitting withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment if trustworthy evidence that
patient would refuse such treatment is presented and "it is clear that the burdens of the patient's continued life with the treatment outweigh the benefits of that life for him"). Trustworthy evidence represents prior expression by the patient that proves insufficient to satisfy
the clear standard required by the subjective test. Id. at 366, 486 A.2d at 1232. The court
indicated that the patient's prior reactions to other people's medical situations would be insufficient to satisfy the subjective test, but may represent trustworthy evidence under the limited objective test. Id.; see also LEGAL FRONTIERS, supra note 1, at 68-76 (discussing best

interest standards and evaluating their application).
69. Conroy, 98 NJ. at 365, 486 A.2d at 1232 (describing pure-objective test and its application); LEGAL FRONMERS, supra note 1, at 69.

70. Conroy, 98 NJ. at 366,486 A.2d at 1232 (finding that treatment may be inhumane if it
causes "recurring unavoidable and severe pain to patient").
71. Id. at 360, 486 A.2d at 1229.
72. Id. at 365, 486 A.2d at 1232.
73. Id. at 366, 486 A.2d at 1232. The NewJersey Supreme Court determined that Conroy's past conduct, statements, and religious beliefs did not satisfy the subjective test. Id. at
385, 486 A.2d at 1242-43. Evidence that Conroy would have refused treatment, however, was
sufficient to meet the lower showing of intent required under the limited-objective test. Id,
486 A.2d at 1242. Nevertheless, the court found insufficient evidence concerning the benefits
or burdens of treatment on Conroy's life to satisfy either the limited-objective or pure-objective tests. Id. at 386, 486 A.2d at 1243. Ultimately, the court determined that if Conroy had
not died before final disposition of the case, her guardian would have been required to explore the benefits and burdens of either withdrawing or continuing treatment. See id. at 387,
486 A.2d at 1243 (noting such issues should be explored fully and any decision should be
cautious and deliberate).
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tests, once the appropriate standard is satisfied, a substituted judgment may be made on behalf of the incompetent individual.
D.

The New Jersey Supreme Court Clarifies Its Position

Despite its expansion of the right to die beyond persistent vegetative state patients at issue in Quinlan, the court in Conroy only provided guidance for cases involving incompetent, elderly, nursing
home patients. 74 The New Jersey Supreme Court elaborated upon
the right of patients to withdraw or withhold medical treatment
75
under other circumstances in three concurrent decisions.
1.

In re Farrell

In re Farrell reaffirmed the right of an informed and competent
patient to decline life-sustaining treatment. 76 As a guide for future
patients, families, and doctors, the court set forth procedures for
competent patients living at home to seek withdrawal of medical
treatment.7 7 First, patients must establish that they are competent
and informed of their prognosis, alternative treatments, and the
74. Conroy, 98 N.J. at 342, 486 A.2d at 1219-20 (limiting scope of decision to incompetent nursing home residents suffering from painful and terminal illness).
75. See In re Farrell, 108 N.J. 335, 353, 529 A.2d 404, 413 (1987) (setting forth procedures governing termination of treatment for competent patient living at home); In re Peter,
108 N.J. 365, 384-85, 529 A.2d 419, 429 (1987) (applying Conroy standards to delegation of
decisionmaking by prior power of attorney); In reJobes, 108 NJ. 394, 399, 529 A.2d 434, 436
(1987) (evaluating validity of surrogate decisionmaking for patient in persistent vegetative
state). Although the New Jersey Supreme Court extended the right to die to individuals
outside the scope of Quinlan and Conroy, the court failed to address other specific situations
involving seriously ill patients. See Comment, The Expense of Expanding the Right to Die: A Trilogy, 5 GA. ST. U.L. REv. 117, 144-45 (1988) (suggesting more guidance is required for application of Farrell,Peter, and Jobes to mentally handicapped, AIDS patients, and health care
institutions and professionals).
76. In re Farrell, 108 N.J. 335, 358-59, 529 A.2d 404, 416 (1987). The court reiterated
that both the common law right to self-determination and a federal and state constitutional
right of privacy support this principle. Id at 347-48, 529 A.2d at 410.
Kathleen Farrell was a 37-year-old competent, but terminally ill patient. Id. at 344-45, 529
A.2d at 408-09. Farrell suffered from a fatal nervous system disorder that ultimately renders a
patient's muscles inoperative, but does not impair the patient's mental faculties. Id. at 344,
529 A.2d at 408. She remained confined to her home where she lay connected to a respirator,
requiring constant medical attention. Id at 345, 529 A.2d at 409. Farrell informed her husband she wanted to have the respirator disconnected. Id Mr. Farrell sought to be appointed
guardian with the specific authority to disconnect the respirator. Id. The trial court concluded that Ms. Farrell's choice was informed and made with a full understanding of the consequences. Id Farrell testified that she had made the decision with her husband, their
children, her parents, her sister, and her psychologist. Id. Farrell's psychologist testified that
Farrell's choice was "not the result of a mere whim or casual decision." Id. The court determined that no countervailing state interest outweighed Farrell's common law and constitutional right to withdraw medical treatment. See id. at 348-53, 529 A.2d at 410-13 (concluding
that state interests in preserving life, preventing suicide, safeguarding integrity of medical
profession, and protecting innocent third-parties were not compelling in this case).
77. Id. at 353, 529 A.2d at 413. The court noted, however, that a competent patient's
right to refuse treatment does not change solely because the patient remains at home rather
than in a medical institution. Id. at 354, 529 A.2d at 413-14.
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risks involved in terminating treatment. 78 To ensure that a patient
is actually competent and informed, two non-attending physicians
must participate in this initial stage. 79 Second, the patient must
show that the choice to terminate or decline treatment was voluntary and not coerced.8 0 Finally, a court must determine that the patient's informed and voluntary decision to withdraw treatment
outweighs the state's interest in preserving life, preventing suicide,
safeguarding the integrity of the medical profession, and protecting
innocent third parties. 8 ' Presumably, no state interest could out8 2
weigh the informed decision of a competent individual.
2.

In re Peter

In re Peter8 3 addressed the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment
from a patient in a persistent vegetative state who had dearly expressed her wishes with regard to such a decision.8 4 The patient
executed a power of attorney several years prior to her incompetency specifically authorizing a friend to make all her health care
decisions, including consent to treatment.8 5 The New Jersey
78. Farrell, 108 NJ. at 354, 529 A.2d at 413.
79. Id. at 356, 529 A.2d at 415.
80. IA at 354, 529 A.2d at 413.
81. Id. Whether based on a constitutional right of privacy or the common law doctrine
of informed consent, the right to forgo life-sustaining treatment traditionally is weighed
against the competing state interests in the preservation of human life, the prevention of suicide, the protection of innocent third parties, and the maintenance of the ethical integrity of
the medical profession. See, e.g., Rasmussen ex rel. Mitchell v. Fleming, 154 Ariz. 207, 216-18,
741 P.2d 674, 683-85 (1987) (balancing common law doctrine of informed consent with enumerated state interests); Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160, 162-64 (Fla. Dist Ct. App. 1978),
aff'd, 379 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1980) (weighing constitutional right to privacy against four state
interests); Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 741-45,
370 N.E.2d 417, 425-27 (1977) (reviewing decisions in which state interests were balanced
with individual's right to refuse medical intervention); Note, The Suicide Trap: Bouvia v. Superior Court and the Right to Refuse Medical Treatment, 21 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 219, 234-50 (1987)
(analyzing both patient and state interests in right to refuse medical treatment).
82. Farrell, 108 NJ. at 354, 529 A.2d at 413 (concluding that competent patient's right to
sovereignty over own body generally outweighs any state interest).
83. 108 N.J. 335, 529 A.2d 404 (1987).
84. In re Peter, 108 N.J. 365, 370, 529 A.2d 419, 421-22 (1987). Ms. Peter was a 65-yearold nursing home patient maintained in a persistent vegetative state, without hope of recovery, but not expected to die in the near future. Id.
85. Isd at 370-71, 529 A.2d at 422. The power of attorney authorized her friend:
to make all decisions with respect to [her] health, as if he were next of kin; to hire
physicians, nurses or other medical personnel if any, and all medical treatment which
[she] require[s], and to be authorized to consent to any medical treatment, operation
or medical procedure [she] might require, to be given full and complete authority to
manage and direct [her] medical care.
Id. at 371, 529 A.2d at 422.
The trial court appointed Peter's friend as her guardian, but ordered that he not make any
decisions to withhold or withdraw medical treatment without informing and obtaining approval from the Office of the Ombudsman for the Institutionalized Elderly. Id. The
Ombudsman concluded that, although Peter would not have wanted to be kept alive by
mechanical means, the court's opinion in Conroy prevented the office from authorizing re-
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Supreme Court distinguished Peter from Conroy, because, unlike the
conscious patient at issue in Conroy, Peter remained in a persistent
vegetative state.8 6 Application of either the limited-objective or objective standard was, therefore, inappropriate.8 7 The court concluded that when a persistent vegetative state patient leaves clear
and convincing evidence of intentions regarding medical treatment
decisions, courts must employ the guidelines and procedures enunciated by the Conroy subjective test in order to best enforce those
wishes.8 8 If such a patient leaves no directives concerning life-sustaining treatment or if the evidence is unclear, the guidelines and
procedures of Quinlan control.8 9
3.

In re Jobes

In the third companion case, the court considered a situation alluded to in Peter, the validity of surrogate decisionmaking on behalf
of a persistent vegetative state patient when there is no clear evidence of the patient's medical wishes. 9 0 In rejobes involved a patient
who suffered severe loss of oxygen to her brain during surgery. 9 1
Unlike Peter, however, Jobes had not previously expressed her de92
sire not to be sustained in a persistent vegetative state.
moval of her life-sustaining treatment. Id. at 371-72, 529 A.2d at 422. The New Jersey
Supreme Court granted her guardian's application for direct certification in order to clarify
the court's position on the withdrawal or withholding of treatment from patients in a persistent vegetative state. Id. at 372, 529 A.2d at 422.
86. Peter, 108 NJ. at 374, 529 A.2d at 424 (finding Peter's status more analogous to

situation at issue in Quinlan than in Conroy).
87. Id. The court reasoned that because Peter was in a vegetative state, the weighing of
benefits and burdens required by the Conroy limited-objective and pure-objective tests was
impossible. Id. at 376-77, 529 A.2d at 425. Stressing that these objective tests were not
designed for patients in a persistent vegetative state, the court concluded that guidance for
such cases should come from Quinlan. Id. at 377, 529 A.2d at 425. Under Quinlan, where the
guardian concludes the persistent vegetative state patient would not want life-sustaining treatment, the guardian may seek to terminate the treatment on the patient's behalf. In re Quinlan,
70 N.J. 10, 41-42, 355 A.2d 647, 664, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976). The court found that
Peter left clear evidence of her intent not to be sustained by medical treatment and accordingly applied the Conroy subjective test. Peter, 108 NJ. at 377, 529 A.2d at 425.
88. Id. at 384-85, 529 A.2d at 429.
89. Id. at 385, 529 A.2d at 429.
90. In reJobes, 108 N.J. 394, 399, 529 A.2d 434, 436 (1987).
91. Id. at 401, 529 A.2d at 437. Doctors treated Ms. Jobes, who was more than four
months pregnant, for injuries sustained in an automobile accident. Id. The oxygen loss occurred during an attempt to remove the fetus which had been destroyed in the accident. Id.
92. Id. at 399, 529 A.2d at 436. Peter set guidelines and procedures for withdrawing
treatment from an elderly nursing home patient in a persistent vegetative state who, while
competent, had clearly expressed her desire to discontinue life-sustaining treatment in this
condition. See Peter, 108 NJ. at 484-85, 529 A.2d at 429 (summarizing doctrinal conclusions
mandating application of Conroy subjective test to persistent vegetative state patient who
clearly enunciated her wishes). In contrast, Jobes required the court to set guidelines and
procedures for a patient who left no clear directives while competent. SeeJobes, 108 NJ. at
412, 529 A.2d at 443 (characterizing patient's prior statements regarding her medical care as
"remote, general, spontaneous, and made in casual circumstances").
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Under the Conroy subjective test, as applied in Peter, courts must
weigh the probative value of a patient's prior expression of medical
preferences by considering the "remoteness, consistency, and
thoughtfulness" of the statements or acts, as well as the maturity of
the person at the time of the statements or acts. 93 The court inJobes
concluded that, despite testimony by the patient's friends and relatives, evidence of her intent was not sufficiently clear and convincing
to satisfy the subjective test. 94 Following its mandate in Peter, the
Jobes court turned to Quinlan for guidance and held that a surrogate
decisionmaker may implement the decision the incompetent person
would have made if competent. 9 5 When an incompetent patient's
wishes are not clearly expressed, the substituted judgment doctrine
requires that the surrogate decisionmaker consider the patient's
personal value system, past reactions to medical issues, and all aspects of the patient's personality to "extrapolate what course of
medical treatment the patient would choose." 9 6 Jobes recognized
family members as the most appropriate parties to make a substituted medical decision on behalf of an incompetent patient. 9 7 As
of
such, the court authorized Jobes' husband to implement removal
98
the life-sustaining food and nutrition from his comatose wife.
93. See Conroy, 98 NJ. at 362, 486 A.2d at 1230 (citing In re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d 114,
131, 660 P.2d 738, 748 (1983), modified, In re Hamlin, 102 Wash. 2d 810, 689 P.2d 1372
(1984)). Peter concluded that the Conroy subjective test is applicable to all surrogate refusal of
treatment cases, regardless of the patient's life expectancy or medical status. Peter, 108 NJ. at
377, 529 A.2d at 425.
94. See In reJobes, 108 NJ. 394, 412-13, 529 A.2d 434, 443 (1987) (characterizing evidence presented as trustworthy but not sufficiently clear and convincing to meet subjective
test requirements).
95. SeeJobes, 108 N.J. at 413-15, 529 A.2d at 444 (outlining substituted judgment doctrine developed in Quinlan). The court applied its conclusion in Peter toJobes and held that
neither the life-expectancy test nor the balancing test set forth in Conroy may be applied to
cases involving persistently vegetative patients. Id. at 413, 529 A.2d at 443.
96. Id at 414-15, 529 A.2d at 444. The court suggested the surrogate also consider the
patient's philosophical, theological, and ethical values. Id
97. See id. at 415-20, 529 A.2d at 444-47 (discussing court's view of family members as
proper parties to effect substituted medical judgments for incompetent patients). TheJobes
court noted that:
Family members are the best qualified to make substituted judgments for incompetent patients not only because of their peculiar grasp of the patient's approach to life,
but also because of their special bonds with him or her. Our common human experience informs us that family members are generally most concerned with the welfare
of a patient. It is they who provide for the patient's comfort, care, and best interests,
and they who treat the patient as a person, rather than a symbol of a cause.
Id. at 416, 529 A.2d at 445 (citation omitted); see also In re Farrell, 108 NJ. 335, 355, 529 A.2d

404, 414 (1987) (recognizing importance of family involvement in medical decisionmaking for

incompetent patients); Rhoden, Litigating Life and Death, 102 HARV. L. REV. 375, 437-45

(1988) (supporting family decisionmaking for incompetent patients and setting forth applicable guidelines).
98. Jobes, 108 N.J. at 428, 529 A.2d at 452 (affirming trial court decision to allow removal

of life-sustaining treatment).
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LEGISLATIVE ACTION REGARDING LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT
AND MEDICAL DECISIONMAKING

The application of the clear and convincing standard by the New
York Court of Appeals in Storar and O'Connor, and the New Jersey
Supreme Court's development of substituted judgment standards in
Quinlan, Conroy, Farrell, Peter, and Jobes, represent two judicial
frameworks designed to address the problem of medical decisionmaking for incompetent patients. 9 9 The courts developed both approaches without the aid of specific legislation addressing the
termination of medical care for incompetent patients who have not
clearly expressed their intent regarding such treatment.1 0 0 A brief
summary of the various legislative schemes currently in place provides a foundation for an analysis of the Supreme Court's decision
in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health.
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws drafted model legislation to address specific problems relating
to terminal patients and the medical decisions that affect them. 10 1
Specifically, the Uniform Rights of the Terminally Ill Act
(URTIA)1 0 2 provides that a competent person may make a declaration governing the withdrawal or withholding of life-sustaining
medical treatment.10 3 The patient's prior directives only become
99. See supra notes 23-37 and accompanying text (describing clear and convincing standards proposed by New York Court of Appeals in Storar);supra notes 53-73 and accompanying
text (discussing New Jersey Supreme Court substituted judgment doctrine and various tests
employed to ratify surrogate decisionmaking).
100. See, e.g., Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728,
755 n.18, 370 N.E.2d 417, 432 n.18 (1977) (declining invitation to formulate comprehensive
guidelines applicable to emergency medical situations involving incompetent patients because
this decision is better left to legislature); In re Farrell, 108 NJ. 335, 360-62, 529 A.2d 404,
416-17 (1987) (O'HernJ., concurring) (stating that trial courts may not cite absence of clear
legislative guidance as excuse to avoid ruling on such issues); In re Conroy, 98 NJ. 321, 345,
486 A.2d 1209, 1221 (1985) (noting absence of specific legislation governing termination of
life-sustaining treatment); In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 382-83, 420 N.E.2d 64, 73-74, 438
N.Y.S.2d 266, 276 (1981) (concluding that courts may declare rights under existing law, but
recognizing that enlarging role of court in cases involving termination of life-sustaining treatment should come from legislature).
101. See Chapman, The Uniform Rights of the Terminally IllAct: Too Little, Too Late?, 42 ARK. L.
REv. 319, 329- 49 (1989) (tracing legislative, judicial, and other developments involving living
wills and health-care acts, President's Commission on "Deciding to Forego Life-Sustaining
Treatment," and drafting of Uniform Rights of the Terminally Ill Act).
102. UNIFORM RIGHTS OF THE TERMINALLY ILL Aar, 9B U.L.A. 68 (Supp. 1990) (URTIA);
see Chapman, supra note 101, at 347-49 (discussing development of URTIA). In 1983, an
appointed twelve-member committee of the Uniform Law Commissioners (ULC) began drafting the new law. See id. at 347-48 (providing details of drafting procedure). A majority of
states present, but no fewer than 20, was required to approve the draft before it was officially
adopted by the ULC. Id. at 349. The URTIA was approved in August of 1985 with 37 states
voting in favor of the Act and 10 against. See Marzen, The "Uniform Rights of the Terminally Ill
Act". A CriticalAnalysis, 1 IssuEs L. & MED. 441, 441 n.1 (1986) (listing states voting for or
against approval). Two states abstained and three states failed to vote. Id.
103. Section 2 of the URTIA provides:
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operative when they are communicated to the attending physician
and that doctor determines that the patient is in a terminal condition and is no longer capable of making decisions regarding lifesustaining treatment.10 4 The URTIA, however, is limited in scope
and provides no guidance for situations involving significant categories of patients.' 0 5 The URTIA does not encompass minors, persons who have not executed a declaration before becoming ill,
adults who have never been capable of executing medical directives,
and non-terminal patients who will never regain consciousness.' 0 6
The URTIA fails, therefore, to address the problem raised in Storar,
O'Connor, Quinlan, Conroy, andjobes: the failure to enunciate substantive and procedural guidelines for courts to follow when a patient
has not executed a prior declaration concerning the withholding or
withdrawal of medical treatment.
Living will laws are designed to protect patient choice by permitting individuals to execute a document expressing their own wishes
regarding life-sustaining treatment.107 Living wills describe patients' treatment choices in specific situations should they become
(a) An individual of sound mind and [18] or more years of age may execute at
any time a declaration governing the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining
treatment. The declarant may designate another individual of sound mind and [18]
or more years of age to make decisions governing the withholding or withdrawal of
life-sustaining treatment. The declaration must be signed by the declarant, or another at the declarant's direction, and witnessed by two individuals.
(b) A declaration directing a physician to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining
treatment may but need not be in the following form:
DECLARATION
If I should have an incurable and irreversible condition that, without the administration of life-sustaining treatment, will, in the opinion of my attending physician,
cause my death within a relatively short time, and I am no longer able to make decisions regarding my medical treatment, I direct my attending physician, pursuant to
the Uniform Rights of the Terminally Ill Act of this State, to withhold or withdraw
treatment that only prolongs the process of dying and is not necessary for my comfort or to alleviate pain.
UNIFORM RIGHrs OF THE TERMINALLY ILL Aar § 2(a)-(b), 9B U.L.A. 68, 70 (Supp. 1990).
104. Id. § 3, at 73.
105. See Chapman, supra note 101, at 350 (indicating URTIA fails to address rights of
substantial number of patients).
106. Id.
107. SeeJ. MURPHY, 3 MURPHY'S WILL CLAUSES (MB) ch. 20, § A2(c)(1) (Dec. 1988) (pro504.1 to .2 (discussviding overview of statutes regarding living wills); Collin, supra note 4,
ing Society for the Right to Die "Living Will" and statutory living wills); Note, Living Wills in
New York: Are They Valid?, 38 SYRACUSE L. REv. 1369, 1372-75 (1987) (tracing development of
living wills).
For example, the form created by the Society for the Right to Die provides:
A Living Will
, being of sound mind, make this statement as a directive to be followed if I
I,become permanently unable to participate in decisions regarding my medical care.
These instructions reflect my firm and settled commitment to decline medical treatment under the circumstances indicated below.
I direct my attending physician to withhold or withdraw treatment that serves only
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incapable of expressing their views at the time a decision must be
made.10 8 Living will statutes often define the conditions under
which such documents become effective. These statutes typically
conclude that the patient must be in a "terminal condition."'' 0 9 The
URTIA defines terminal condition as a permanent medical condi-

tion requiring provision of life-sustaining treatment to prevent imminent death.1 1 0 The URTIA leaves to individual statutes the

responsibility for listing specific medical procedures included within
the definition of life-sustaining treatment, as well as specifying wit-

ness procedures and immunity provisions for health care providers
who follow the directives of the living will."' Notwithstanding the
availability of statutorily delineated procedures, many individuals do

not have the foresight or desire to set forth their personal treatment
to prolong the process of my dying, if I should be in an incurable or irreversible
mental or physical condition with no reasonable expectation of recovery.
These instructions apply if I am (a) in a terminal condition; (b) permanently unconscious, or (c) if I am conscious but have irreversible brain damage and will never
regain the ability to make decisions and express my wishes.
I direct that treatment be limited to measures to keep me comfortable and to relieve pain, including any pain that might occur by withholding or withdrawing treatment.
While I understand that I am not legally required to be specific about future treatments, if I am in the condition(s) described above I feel especially strongly about the
following forms of treatment:
I do not want cardiac resuscitation.
I do not want mechanical respiration.
I do not want tube feeding.
I do not want antibiotics.
I do not want maximum pain relief.
Other directions (insert personal instructions):

These directions express my legal right to refuse treatment under the law of New
York State. I intend my instructions to be carried out, unless I have rescinded them
in a new writing or by clearly indicating that I have changed my mind.
Date:
Signed:
Witness:
Address:
Witness:
Address:
How to Put Life in the Right to Die, N.Y. Times, June 27, 1990, at A22, col. 1.
Although the sample provided applies to New York law, currently 40 states and the District
of Columbia have living will statutes. See supra note 2 (enumerating living will statutes);
McMillion, The Right to Terminate Care, A.B.A.J., Oct. 1990, at 134 (reviewing legislative initiatives involving medical treatment decisions). The Society's will has no statutory basis under
any state law. Collin, supra note 4, at 1 504.1. It may, however, provide important guidance
to a surrogate decisionmaker exercising substituted judgment and provide clear and convincing evidence of an incompetent patient's intent. Id.
108. J. MURPHY, supra note 107, ch. 20, § A2, at 20-5 (discussing living will forms).
109. See URTIA § 3, 9B U.L.A. 68, 73 (Supp. 1990) (providing uniform requirements after which living wills become effective including confirmation of patient's terminal status).
110. Id. § 1, at 68. The URTIA defines "terminal condition" as "an incurable or irreversible condition that, without the administration of life-sustaining treatment, will, in the opinion
of the attending physicians, result in death within a relatively short time." Id.
111. See generallyJ. MURPHY, supra note 107, § C (discussing contents of health care directives and providing forms for protecting patient choice in medical treatment cases).
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decisions in a living will. " 2 Treatment decisions are therefore limited not only by the narrow scope of living will laws, which are generally applicable only to patients facing imminent death or terminal
illness, but also by the fact that many individuals will not have exe3
cuted a living will prior to an event rendering them incompetent." 1
The limitations of living wills have caused many state legislatures
to enact specific durable power of attorney statutes to protect health
care decisions.' 14 A Durable Power of Attorney for Health Care
(DPAHC) allows a competent individual to appoint another person
to make decisions regarding life-sustaining treatment should the
person become incompetent.' 1 5 While a living will itself provides
112. It appears that only 15 to 20% of adult Americans have written a living will. Schultz,
Ruling Draws the Worried to 'Living Wills', Wall St. J., June 29, 1990, at Cl, col. 3 (citing American Medical Association estimate); McCrary & Botkin, Hospital Policy on Advance Directives: Do
Institutions Ask Patients About Living Wills?, 262 J. A.M.A. 2411, 2411 (1989) (reporting poll

indicating that while 56% of respondents had expressed preferences to their families, only
15% claimed to have completed living wills).
113. See MEYERS, MEDICO-LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF DEATH AND DYING § 11:7, at 277-78
(1981 & Supp. 1990) (suggesting that most people do not like to contemplate circumstances
of their own death); SOCIETY FOR THE RIGHT TO DIE, THE PHYSICIAN AND THE HOPELESSLY ILL

PATIENT 24-25, 40 (1985) (noting requirement of terminal condition before prior directives
are given effect is typical in living will statutes).
114. See Collin, supra note 4, 500.1 (indicating that all 50 states and District of Columbia
have general durable power of attorney statutes); see also McMillion, supra note 107, at 134

(stating that in past two years, 32 states have enacted specific health care power of attorney
laws in response to living will statutory limitations); Katzeff, States Go to Work After Cruzan,
Nat'l LJ., Sept. 24, 1990, at 16, col. 1 (contending that number of states enacting such durable power of attorney acts has doubled in past year). Unlike durable powers of attorney,
traditional powers of attorney become invalid when the maker of the power of attorney becomes incapacitated. See Collin & Meyers, Usinga DurablePower ofAttomney for the Authorization of
Withdrawal of Medical Care, I1 EST. PLAN. 282, 282 (1984) (advocating use of durable power of

attorney to authorize withdrawal of medical treatment).
115. See Collin, supra note 4,
500, 504.3-505 (furnishing detailed analysis of durable
powers of attorney for health care and discussing planning and drafting techniques). Many
jurisdictions allow the appointment of an individual (proxy) to make decisions regarding lifesustaining treatment. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-5501 to -5502 (1975), as interpreted by Rasmussen ex re. Mitchell v. Fleming, 154 Ariz. 207, 221 n.21, 741 P.2d 674, 688
n.21 (1987) (holding treatment wishes might be shown in durable power of attorney or proxy
appointment); CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 2410(b), 2430-2443, 2500-2508 (Deering Supp. 1990) (gov-

erning durable power of attorney authority including consent to or refusal of medical treatment); COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-14-501 (1987 & Supp. 1990), as interpreted by In re Rodas, No.
86PR139, slip op. at 34-35, 38 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Mesa County April 3, 1987) (holding durable
power of attorney may authorize proxy to refuse treatment); D.C. CODE ANN., §§ 21-2201 to
-2213 (1989) (setting forth procedures and guidelines for surrogate health care decisionmaking); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 551D-1, 327D-26 (Supp. 1990) (providing no health care language
in durable power of attorney, but living will statute refers to durable power of attorney as
document of intent); IDAHO CODE § 39-4505 (Supp. 1990) (providing for durable power of
attorney to delegate power to consent, refuse consent, or withdraw consent to treatment); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, 804-3 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1988) (allowing durable power of attorney to be used to delegate power to consent, refuse consent, or withdraw consent to treatment); IOWA CODE §§ 633.705, 144A.7(l)(a) (1989) (providing no health care language in
power of attorney statute, but explicitly recognizing power of attorney validity in living will
statute); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 5-501 (Supp. 1990) (allowing durable power of attorney authority including power to withhold consent to any medical treatment); MD. HEALTH
GEN. CODE ANN. § 20-107(d) (1989) (containing health care reference to durable power of
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the decision on medical treatment for the patient, a DPAHC
designates another individual to dictate medical treatment decisions
for the patient.' 16 As with the URTIA and living wills, a DPAHC is
only useful when an individual has decided to execute it. Several
states have reacted to this deficiency by including surrogate decisionmaking provisions in their statutes that authorize certain individuals to make health care decisions on behalf of incompetent
patients. 17
attorney statute in MD. EsT. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. §§ 13-601); NEV. REV. STAT. § 449.800 to
.860 (Supp. 1990) (providing that durable power of attorney may be used to consent, refuse
consent, or withdraw consent to any medical treatment); NJ. STAT. ANN. §§ 46:2B-8 to 2B-9
(West 1989), as interpreted by In re Peter, 108 NJ. 365, 378-79, 529 A.2d 419, 426 (1987)
(holding that durable power of attorney statutes can be used to delegate all health care decisions, including termination of treatment decisions); N.Y. GEN. OBLIW. LAW § 5-1601 to 1602
(McKinney 1989 & Supp. 1991) (providing that durable power of attorney can be used to
specifically delegate responsibility to communicate person's decision to decline treatment
under defined circumstances, but not to generally delegate medical decisions), as interpreted
by In re Westchester County Medical Center ex re.O'Connor, 72 N.Y.2d 517, 528 n.2, 531
N.E.2d 607, 612 n.2, 534 N.Y.S.2d 886, 891 n.2 (1988) (finding no reason to prevent appointing another to express specific or general desires regarding medical treatment in the
event of incompetency); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 32A-1, 32A-2(9) (1987 & Supp. 1990) (allowing
durable power of attorney short form to be used for personal relationships and affairs, including principal health care); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 127.505 to .585 (1990 Supp.) (providing specific
durable power of attorney for health care); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-4.10-2 (1989) (providing
health care power of attorney form authorizing power to consent, refuse consent, or withdraw
consent to treatment); TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4590h-I (Vernon Supp. 1991) (defining
valid durable power of attorney for health care); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, §§ 3451-3467 (1989 &
Supp. 1990) (allowing durable power of attorney to permit, refuse, or withdraw consent for
treatment).
116. See Katzeff, supra note 114 (noting differences between living wills and durable powers of attorney). The durable power of attorney is seen as politically preferable to living wills
because right to die opponents believe the power of attorney may better protect individual
patients' rights from abuse. Id.; see also Collin, supra note 4,
504-504.3 (discussing difference between advance directives, living wills, and durable power of attorney for health care).
117. See, e.g., Arkansas Rights of the Terminally Ill or Permanently Unconscious Act, ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 20-17-214 (Supp. 1989) (noting who may execute written request to withdraw or
refuse treatment for another); Connecticut Removal of Life Support Systems Act, CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 19a-571 (West Supp. 1990) (absolving medical provider of civil liability for terminating life support of incompetent terminal patient if informed consent given by next of
kin); District of Columbia Health Care Decisions Act of 1988, D.C. CODE ANN. § 21-2210
(1989) (providing for substituted consent in absence of durable power of attorney); Florida
Life Prolonging Procedures Act, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.07 (West 1986 & Supp. 1990) (allowing withdrawal or refusal of life-prolonging treatment but not permitting any presumption
of patient's intent); Iowa Life Sustaining Procedures Act, IOWA CODE ANN. § 144A.7 (West
1989 & Supp. 1990) (delineating procedure in absence of declaration of intent); Louisiana
Declarations Concerning Life-Sustaining Procedures Act, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §40:1299.58.5
(West Supp. 1990) (providing procedure for making declaration for patient who has not previously made declaration and is presently incapable); New Mexico Right to Die Act, N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 24-7-8.1 (1986) (permitting substituted consent for incompetent person who has
not executed document); North Carolina Right to Natural Death Act, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90322 (1990) (setting forth procedures for natural death in absence of declaration); Oregon
Rights with Respect to Terminal Illness Act, OR. REV. STAT. § 127.635(2) (Supp. 1990) (delegating medical decisionmaking authority for incompetent terminal patient in absence of prior
directive to spouse, guardian, a majority of adult children located, or parent in that order);
TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 672.009 (Vernon Supp. 1991) (delineating procedure
when person has not executed or issued directive and is incompetent or incapable of communication); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-1105(2) (Supp. 1990) (delegating proxy authority to sign
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State courts have supplemented these statutory rights by specifically addressing whether an incompetent individual may have lifesustaining treatment withheld or withdrawn without any previouslyinitiated directive by the patient.1 18 Nevertheless, clear legislative
guidance protecting an individual's interests, in the absence of clear
expression of intent, remains absent.
III.

CRUZAN V. DIRECTOR, MISSOURI DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH

A. Factual Background and Lower Court Holdings
On January 11, 1983, Nancy Beth Cruzan was severely injured in
an automobile accident. 1 19 After transporting her to the hospital,
doctors diagnosed Cruzan as suffering from severe brain damage
resulting from the impact of the collision and lack of oxygen to the
brain. 120 To aid in her recovery and to provide nourishment, docmedical directive); Virginia Natural Death Act, VA. COpE ANN. § 54.1-2986 (1988) (providing
procedure in absence of declaration for surrogate health care decisionmaking); see also URTIA
§ 7, 9B U.L.A. 68, 76-77 (Supp. 1990) (outlining requirements for valid consent by others for
withdrawal or withholding of treatment). These statutory surrogate provisions provide a procedure by which an attending physician may obtain consent to withhold or withdraw lifesustaining treatment in the absence of an effective declaration by the incompetent patient. l
§ 7 comment, at 77. Moreover, these statutes guide the attending physician or other health
care provider in determining who should be contacted for consent to withdraw or withhold
life-sustaining treatment. Id.
118. See supra notes 65-70 and accompanying text (setting forth illustrative case law in
Conroy).
119. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 410-11 (Mo. 1988) (en banc) (noting accident
caused Cruzan's vehicle to overturn and throw her 35 feet from vehicle), aff'd, Cruzan v.
Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990).
120. Id. at 411. The trial court made the following factual findings about Nancy Cruzan:
1. That her respiration and circulation are not artificially maintained and within
essentially normal limits of a 30-year-old female with vital signs recently reported as
BP 130/80; pulse 78 and regular, and respiration spontaneous at 16 to 18 per
minute.
2. That she is oblivious to her environment except for reflexive responses to sound
and perhaps to painful stimuli.
3. That she has suffered anoxia of the brain resulting in massive enlargement of the
ventricles filling with cerebro-spinal fluid in the area where the brain has degenerated. This cerebral cortical atrophy is irreversible, permanent, progressive, and
ongoing.
4. That her highest cognitive brain function is exhibited by her grimacing perhaps
in recognition of ordinary painful stimuli, indicating the experience of pain and her
apparent response to sound.
5. That she is a spastic quadriplegic.
6. That she has contractures of her four extremities which are slowly progressive
with irreversible muscular and tendon damage to all extremities.
7. That she has no cognitive or reflexive ability to swallow food or water to maintain her daily essential needs. That she will never recover her ability to swallow sufficient [sic] to satisfy her needs.
App. to Petition for Cert. at A95, Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408 (Mo. 1988) (No. 70813)
(Mar. 13, 1989).
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tors inserted a gastrostomy tube.1 21 Cruzan remained in a coma for
three weeks and then showed some signs of improvement. Further
rehabilitative efforts failed, however, and her condition ultimately
required that all nutrition and hydration be administered through
12 2
the gastrostomy tube.
Nearly five years after her accident, Cruzan's parents, as her appointed guardians, sought court approval to discontinue further nutrition and hydration to their daughter.123 The trial court
emphasized that, before a person may be declared incapacitated and
have a guardian appointed, both the due process clause of the
United States Constitution and the Missouri living will statute require clear and convincing evidence of physical and mental incapacitation. 124 Thus, this standard is the minimum showing required for
the court to authorize the guardians to discontinue life-sustaining
125
nutrition and hydration of their ward.
The court concluded that the Cruzans met this standard. 12 6 Public policy, however, as enunciated by the Missouri legislature, pro12 7
hibited withholding or withdrawing nutrition or hydration.
Nevertheless, the trial court determined that there is a fundamental
"right to liberty" expressed in the Missouri constitution which permits an individual to refuse or direct withdrawing or withholding
artificial medical treatment.1 23 To deny Cruzan's guardians the authority to withdraw her nutrition and hydration would deprive
121. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 411 (Mo. 1988) (en banc), aft'd, Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990).
122. Id.
123. See App. to Petition for Cert. at A95-A96, Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408 (Mo.
1988) (No. 70813) (Mar. 13, 1989) (providing text of unreported trial court opinion). The
Cruzan's filed a declaratory judgment action in probate court on Nancy's behalf on October
23, 1987. Petition for Cert. at 6, Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408 (Mo. 1988) (No. 70813)
(Mar. 13, 1989).
124. Id. at A96-A97. The fourteenth amendment provides:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; norshall any State deprive any person of life, liberty or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added).
125. App. to Petition for Cert. at A97, Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408 (Mo. 1988)
(No. 70813) (Mar. 13, 1989).
126. Id. The court reasoned that Cruzan's serious thoughts expressed to a friend prior to
her accident, in which she related that if she were sick or injured she would not wish to continue her life, suggested that in her present condition she would not wish to continue treatment. Id. at A97-A98.
127. Id. at A98; see Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 459.10(3) (West Supp. 1990) (excluding procedures
involving nutrition or hydration from death-prolonging procedures that may be withheld or
withdrawn).
128. App. to Petition for Cert. at A98-A99, Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408 (Mo.
1988) (No. 70813) (Mar. 13, 1989) (citing Mo. CONST. art I, §§ 2, 10). The court rationalized
that such death-prolonging procedures may only be withheld where no injury to innocent
third parties occurs, no homicide or suicide results, and good ethical standards in the medical
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therefore,
Nancy Cruzan of equal protection of the law. The court,
129
directed the hospital to honor the family's request.
The Missouri Supreme Court reversed. 3 0 In a divided decision,
the court held that the guardians did not have the authority to order
withdrawal of Cruzan's nutrition and hydration, primarily because
the right of privacy under the state constitution did not allow refusal
court found no such
of treatment in every case.' 3 ' Similarly, the
3 2
Constitution.'
States
right under the United
The majority reasoned that the right to refuse medical treatment
must be balanced against appropriate state interests, and that the
Missouri living will statute embodies a strong state policy favoring
the preservation of life.13 3 Since Cruzan was not terminally ill, had a
life-expectancy of thirty more years, and was not in physical pain,
the court held that the burden of her treatment did not outweigh
the state's vital interest in sustaining her life.' 3 4 The Missouri
Supreme Court found that Cruzan's statements to a friend regarding her desire to die under certain circumstances were informal reactions to the medical treatment or conditions of others and did not
constitute a clear and convincing expression of her intent.' 3 5 Absent inherently reliable evidence that an incompetent person would
want nutrition and hydration discontinued, the court held that no
other person could compel such a choice.' 3 6 Finding no legal basis
for the Cruzans to terminate Nancy's medical care, and given the
strong state policy favoring life, the court denied the Cruzans the
right to disconnect her artificial nutrition and hydration.' 3 7 The
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether
the Constitution permitted patients or their guardians to direct the
profession are maintained. I at A98. The court found no such problems present in this
case. Id.
129. Id at A99-AI00.
130. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 427 (Mo. 1988) (en banc), aff'd, Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990).
131. Id. at 417.
132. Id at 418 (noting Supreme Court has not extended right of privacy to permit patient
or guardian to direct withdrawal of nutrition and hydration).
133. See id. at 419-20 (regarding state's interest in life as unqualified without regard to
quality of life); see also supra note 81 (discussing general state interests usually weighed against
right to forgo life-sustaining treatment). See generally Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 459.010 to .055
(West Supp. 1990) (providing text of Missouri act).
134. See Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 424 (Mo. 1988) (en banc) (characterizing
state's interest in life as immense), aff'd, Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct.
2841 (1990).
135. Id. at 424 (citing In reJobes, 108 N.J. 394, 412-13, 529 A.2d 434, 443 (1987), to
demonstrate probative value of prior statements offered to prove intent).
136. Id. at 426.
137. Id. (recognizing necessity for comprehensive legislation on right-to-die issue and declining to inject court into legislative arena by formulating piecemeal guidelines).
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withholding or withdrawal of medical treatment.' 38
B.
1.

The Decision of the Supreme Court of the United States

The majority decision

The United States Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the
Missouri Supreme Court.' 3 9 The majority found that a competent
person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing
life-sustaining nutrition and hydration. 140 Nevertheless, the Court
rejected the assertion that an incompetent person should possess
the same right and concluded that the United States Constitution
did not preclude Missouri from requiring clear and convincing evidence of an incompetent patient's prior directives concerning with1 41
holding or withdrawing medical treatment.
138. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 109 S. Ct. 3240 (1989).
139. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2856 (1990).
140. Id. at 2852 (reading this conclusion with prior decisions, includingJacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 24-30 (1905) (balancing individual's liberty interest in declining
smallpox treatment against state's interest in preventing disease)).
The Court discussed a substantial body of state case law that based the tight to refuse
treatment on the common law doctrine of informed consent, a constitutional right of privacy,
or statutory authority. See id at 2846-51 (tracing common law basis for right not to consent to
treatment and analyzing right to refuse treatment decisions). The majority opinion acknowledged that at common law, the mere touching of an individual by another without consent
and without legal justification constituted battery. Id. at 2846 (citing W. KEETON, D. DoBBs,
R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, § 9, at 39-42 (5th ed.
1984 & Supp. 1988). The court reasoned that the notion of bodily integrity, embodied in the
doctrine of informed consent, includes a patient's right not to consent, i.e., to refuse medical
treatment. Id at 2846-47.
The majority thereafter surveyed a significant body of cases involving the right to refuse
treatment. Id. at 2847-51; see, e.g., Conservatorship of Drabick, 200 Cal. App. 3d 185, 208,
245 Cal. Rptr. 840, 854-55 (finding statutory basis for removal of nasogastric feeding tube),
cert. denied, 488 U.S. 958 (1988); In re Estate of Longeway, 133 Ill. 2d 33, 49-51, 549 N.E.2d
292, 299-300 (1989) (opting for substituted judgment standard rather than rigid expressed
intent standard, and thus allowing consideration of other clear and convincing evidence of
patient's intent); Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728,
737-38, 370 N.E.2d 417, 424 (1977) (basing decision to permit withholding of treatment on
right of privacy and right of informed consent and determining that incompetent individual's
rights must be protected by substituted judgment standard); In re Conservatorship of Torres,
357 N.W.2d 332, 337-38 (Minn. 1984) (authorizing removal of incompetent patient's respirator as supported by constitutional and statutory authority and in patient's best interest); In re
Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 348, 361-68, 486 A.2d 1209, 1223, 1229-33 (1985) (recognizing federal
right of privacy might apply, but basing decision to remove feeding tube on common law right
to self-determination and informed consent and setting forth subjective and objective "best
interest" analyses to protect patient's rights); In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 38-42, 355 A.2d 647,
662-64, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976) (recognizing qualified right to privacy grounded in
federal Constitution to terminate treatment); In re Westchester County Medical Center ev rel.
O'Connor, 72 N.Y.2d 517, 530, 531 N.E.2d 607, 613, 534 N.Y.S.2d 886, 892 (1988) (rejecting
substituted judgment approach and requiring clear and convincing evidence of patient's expressed intent to withhold or withdraw treatment); In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 376-77, 420
N.E.2d 64, 70, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, 272 (declining to base right to refuse medical treatment on
constitutional right to privacy, and instead requiring clear and convincing evidence of prior
statements made by patient regarding withdrawal of medical treatment), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
858 (1981).
141. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct 2841, 2854 (1990). ChiefJustice
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The Court accepted Missouri's reliance on its interest in the protection and preservation of human life as support for implementing
the clear and convincing standard.' 4 2 The Court noted that where
the choice between life and death would be made on behalf of the
incompetent patient, Missouri could legitimately impose a higher
143
evidentiary standard to protect the personal element of choice.
The Court further held that a state may decline to assess the quality
of life an individual might enjoy and may assert an unqualified interest in the preservation of life to be weighed against the constitution44
ally protected liberty interest of the individual.'
The Court determined that Missouri permissibly sought to advance its interests by adopting the clear and convincing standard of
proof for treatment termination inquiries. 4 5 This standard reflects
the seriousness of the proceeding and places the burden of avoiding
an erroneous decision upon those seeking to terminate an incompetent individual's life-sustaining treatment. 14 6 The Court agreed
with the Missouri Supreme Court's conclusion that the evidence offered at trial-that Cruzan would not have wanted her nutrition and
hydration to continue-was insufficient to satisfy the clear and con47
vincing standard."1
The majority also concluded that the due process clause of the
Constitution does not require a state to accept the substituted judgment of close family members on behalf of an incompetent patient.1 48 The Court reasoned that no assurance exists that the views
Rehnquist authored the opinion in which justices White, O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy
joined.
142. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2852.
143. Id. at 2852-53. The majority added that not all incompetent patients will have a
surrogate decisionmaker acting in their best interests and the state may guard against potential abuses. See id. (citing In reJobes, 108 NJ. 394, 419, 529 A.2d 434, 447 (1987) (noting
these exceptional circumstances mandate appointment of guardian)).
144. Id. at 2853. See generally Procaccino, Life v. Quality of Life: The Dilemma of Emerging
Medical-Legal Standards, 29 MED. TRIAL TECH. Q. 45 (1983) (analyzing ethical, medical, and
legal problems in weighing quality of life as measure for life worthy of protection).
145. Id at 2853.
146. See id. at 2854 (citing Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 755 (1982)) (suggesting that
minimum standard of proof tolerated by due process clause reflects not only weight of private
and public interests affected, but also acts as societal judgment about how risk of error should
be distributed between litigants).
The Court also noted that most states forbid oral testimony in determining the intent of
parties to transactions. Id. The parole evidence rule prohibits modifying a written contract by
oral testimony, and the statute of frauds renders oral contracts to leave property by will unenforceable. Id. (citing 2 A. CORBIN, CoNTRAars § 398, at 360-61 (1950 & Supp. 1990)). Similarly, statutes routinely require wills to be written. Id. (citing 2 W. PAGE, THE LAW OF WILts
§§ 19.3 to .5, at 61-71 (1960 & Supp. 1990)). The Court stated that such requirements may
frustrate the intent of an individual, as Missouri's burden of proof may have done in this case,
but the Constitution does not require general rules to work faultlessly. Id.
147. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2855.
148. Id. at 2855. The Court rejected claims by the Petitioner that Michael H. v. Gerald D.,
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of the substitute decisionmaker would necessarily reflect those of
the patient's.' 4 9 The due process clause does not require the state
to place the decision to withhold or withdraw medical treatment on
anyone other than the individual; thus, Missouri's clear and convinc50
ing standard effectuates this scheme.'
2.

The concurringopinions

In a concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor agreed that individuals
possess a protected liberty interest in refusing medical treatment
and that this interest encompasses the right to refuse nutrition and
hydration.' 5 ' Justice O'Connor added, however, that it is likely the
state would be constitutionally required to give effect to the decisions of a surrogate decisionmaker. 5 2 Justice O'Connor reiterated
that Cruzan does not foreclose this determination, nor does it prevent states from developing and implementing other approaches for
protecting an incompetent individual's liberty interest in refusing
medical treatment.' 5 3 Most importantly, Justice O'Connor noted
that the Court decided only that Missouri's procedure does not violate the Constitution and that further responsibility for developing
appropriate procedures for protecting incompetent individuals' lib54
erty interests resides with the states.'
In a separate concurrence, Justice Scalia agreed with the Court's
109 S. Ct. 2333 (1989) and Parham v.J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979), compelled such a conclusion.
Id. The Court reasoned that upholding the constitutionality of California's favored treatment
of traditional family relationships in Michael H. did not establish a constitutional requirement
that the state must recognize such relationships in medical treatment decision cases. Id. Similarly, Parham, which upheld the constitutionality of a state scheme whereby parents made certain decisions for mentally ill minors, did not mandate that a state recognize such
decisionmaking. Id.
149. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2856 (1990).
150. Id at 2855-56. The Court noted that it was not required to determine whether the

state must give effect to a substitutea judgment on behalf of a patient where the patient had
left competent and probative evidence that the decision to terminate or continue life-sustaining treatment be made on the patient's behalf by that individual. Id. at 2856 n.12.
151. Id. at 2856-57 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor noted that artificial
feeding should not be distinguished from other forms of medical treatment because regardless of whether the court deems the method used to pass food and water into the body medical treatment, it involves some degree of intrusion and restraint. Id. at 2857 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (citing COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, AMERICAN MED. ASS'N, AMA
ETHICAL OPINION 2.20, WITHHOLDING OR WITHDRAWING LIFE-PROLONGING MEDICAL TREATMENT, CURRENT OPINIONS (1989); THE HASTINGS CENTER, GUIDELINES ON THE TERMINATION
OF LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT AND THE CARE OF THE DYING 59 (1987) (providing that consensus of medical community does not support maintaining distinction)). Because requiring
competent adults to endure such procedures against their will burdens their liberty, the real

issue is the intrusiveness of the tubes-not the materials passing through them. Id. at 2857
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
152. See id. at 2857 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (expressing concern that too few individuals provide explicit instructions regarding health care decisions).
153. Id. at 2858-59 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
154. Id. at 2859 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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analysis, but expressed concern that the majority opinion would
only confuse future legislators trying to draft statutes to resolve the
problem of medical decisionmaking for incompetent patients. 15 5
Justice Scalia added that under American law states have always had
the power to prohibit suicide,1 5 6 and, even if clear and convincing
evidence demonstrates that a patient no longer desired life-sustaining treatment, elected representatives of Missouri should decide
whether to honor that choice. 157 Justice Scalia specifically asserted
that the issue raised in Cruzan was not set forth in the due process
clause and the Court, therefore, lacked any authority to inject itself
58
into this field.'
3.

The dissenting opinions

Justice Brennan, in a dissent joined by Justices Marshall and
Blackmun, argued that the liberty interest in refusing medical treatment is fundamental because it "involves one of the basic civil rights
of man," and is "deeply rooted in this nation's history and tradition." 15 9 The dissent insisted that Cruzan's incompetence did not
deprive her of fundamental rights.16 0 AlthoughJustice Brennan asserted that the right to refuse unwanted medical treatment is not
absolute, he concluded that no state interest could outweigh the individual rights of a person in Cruzan's condition. 16 ' Brennan concluded that the state's general interest in the preservation of life
should yield to Cruzan's "particularized and intense interest in self162
determination in her choice of medical treatment."
Justice Brennan rejected the majority's conclusion that Missouri's
clear and convincing standard advanced substantive state inter155. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2859 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia suggested the
Court's approach was "poised to confuse that enterprise as successfully as [it had] confused
the enterprise of legislating concerning abortion." Id.
156. See id. at 2859-62 (Scalia, J., concurring). The petitioner maintained that Cruzan's
case could be distinguished from ordinary suicide: Cruzan remained permanently incapacitated and in pain; she would bring about her death not by any affirmative act but by merely
declining nourishment; and, preventing her from effectuating her presumed wish to die violated her bodily integrity. Id. at 2860 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia found none of
these distinctions sufficient. l at 2860-62 (Scalia, J., concurring).
157. Id. at 2859 (Scalia, J., concurring).
158. Id. at 2863 (Scalia, J., concurring).
159. Id. at 2865 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541
(1942) and Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192 (1986) (quoting Moore v. East Cleveland,
431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (plurality opinion))).
160. Id. at 2867 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
161. Id. at 2869 (Brennan,J., dissenting) (stating that Missouri does not claim that society
as whole would be benefited, that any other party's situation would be improved, or that harm
to third parties would be averted by continuing Cruzan's treatment).
162. Id. at 2870 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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ests.1 6 s He criticized the Missouri procedure for discounting the evidence offered in support of terminating treatment and questioned
the exclusion of relevant evidence of her intent. 1 64 Moreover, Brennan added, the majority did not specifically detail what evidence
would be sufficient to satisfy the clear and convincing standard and
thereby upheld an evidentiary procedure that will often impede the
right of most patients to forgo life-sustaining treatment.165
Justice Brennan further noted that Missouri is essentially the only
state to institute a system of safeguarding the interests of incompetent patients in which the likelihood of accurately determining those
interests is actually lessened.1 6 6 He disagreed with the proposition
that when it is impossible to determine an incompetent patient's
choice, the state's role as parenspatriae permits the state to make the
decision itself.1 6 7 Rather, he asserted, the due process clause requires that if an incompetent individual's medical treatment intentions are unclear, the state must either delegate the choice to the
person the patient would have most likely appointed as proxy or
1 68
leave the decision to the patient's family.
In a separate dissent, Justice Stevens asserted that the Constitu163. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2871-72 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan elaborated:
To be sure, courts have long erected clear and convincing standards to place the
greater risk of erroneous decisions on those bringing disfavored claims, In such
cases, however, the choice to discourage certain claims was a legitimate, constitutional policy choice. In contrast, Missouri has no such power to disfavor a choice by
Nancy Cruzan to avoid medical treatment, because Missouri has no legitimate interest in providing Nancy with treatment until it is established that this represents her
choice. Just as a State may not override Nancy's choice directly, it may not do so
through the imposition of a procedural rule.
Ia (Brennan, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
164. Id. at 2874 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
165. See id at 2874-75 (Brennan,J., dissenting) (suggesting that too few people establish
formal directives, such as living wills, for this procedure to adequately protect the wishes of
incompetent patients).
166. Id. at 2876 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (stating that although choice of method employed in determining incompetent patient's treatment belongs to each state respectively,
states must avoid procedures that will prejudice decisions). Justice Brennan suggested:
There are various approaches to determining an incompetent patient's treatment
choice in use by the several States today and there may be advantages and disadvantages to each and other approaches not yet envisioned. The choice, in largest part, is
and should be left to the States, so long as each State is seeking, in a reliable manner,
to discover what the patient would want. But with such momentous interests in the
balance, States must avoid procedures that will prejudice the decision. 'To err either
way-to keep a person alive under circumstances under which he would rather have
been allowed to die, or to allow that person to die when he would have chosen to
cling to life-would be deeply unfortunate.'
Id at 2876-77 (Brennan,J., dissenting) (quoting In re Conroy, 98 NJ. 321, 343,486 A.2d 1209,
1220 (1985)).
167. Id at 2877 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (suggesting answer is to allow qualified family
members to make substituted judgment for incompetent family member); see alsosupra note 66
(discussing parens patriae doctrine).
168. Crtan, 110 S. Ct. at 2877 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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tion requires Missouri to provide Cruzan with care that respects her
own "best interests."' 169 Justice Stevens found that Missouri unreasonably intruded upon traditionally private matters encompassed
70
within the liberty interest protected by the due process clause.'
The majority limited the right to refuse unwanted medical care to
individuals with the foresight to make an unambiguous expression
of their decisions while competent. 17 1 According to Justice Stevens,
the Missouri procedure failed to bear a reasonable relationship to
any legitimate state concern because it attempted to define rather
than to protect life. 172 Finally, he concluded that the meaning and
completion of Cruzan's life "should be controlled by persons who
have her best interests at heart-not by a state legislature concerned
only with the 'preservation of human life.'"173
IV. AN EVALUATION OF CRUZAN V. DIRECTOR, MISSOURI
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH

A.
1.

Cruzan and Patients' Rights

The "right of privacy" and incompetent patients

Had the United States Supreme Court chosen to overrule the Missouri decision, Cruzan v. Harmon, the Court would have been required to find that the United States Constitution compelled
Missouri to order Nancy Cruzan's physicians to follow the instructions of her family. 174 The Court has never held, however, that a
generalized right of privacy under the Constitution encompasses the
right to refuse treatment. 175 In Cruzan, the Court acknowledged
that state courts have often applied constitutional privacy arguments
as well as common law doctrine to resolve treatment decision
169. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2879 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
170. Id. at 2882 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (agreeing with Judge Blackmar's dissent in Missouri Supreme Court's decision in Cruzan v. Harmon).
171. Id. at 2883 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
172. Id. at 2886 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens argued that a state may not "circumscribe the liberties of the people by regulations designed wholly for the purpose of establishing a sectarian definition of life." Id. at 2888 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Webster v.
Reproductive Health Servs., 109 S. Ct. 3040, 3082-85 (1989) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
173. Id at 2892 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
174. See id. at 2852 (analyzing Petitioner's argument that incompetent person who is unable to make choice to exercise right to refuse treatment must have such right exercised
through surrogate). The Missouri Supreme Court considered this argument but rejected it.
See Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 417-18 (Mo. 1988) (en banc) (finding no such right
under state constitution and expressing doubts whether it exists under federal Constitution),
aft'd, Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990).
175. Mayo, supra note 6, at 111-25 (tracing early development of right of privacy and concluding Court's decisions do not provide basis for extending privacy protection to medical
decisionmaking). Numerous state courts, however, have held that the federal Constitution
supports such a conclusion. See Rasmussen ex rel Mitchell v. Fleming, 154 Ariz. 207, 215 n.8,
741 P.2d 674, 682 n.8 (1987) (listing cases holding constitutional right applicable).
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cases. 1 76 The Court, nevertheless, declined to endorse the privacy
approach and analyzed the issue of medical treatment decisions in
terms of an individual's fourteenth amendment liberty interest. 177
The Court's conclusion should not have been entirely unexpected,
given its hesitancy to extend the right of privacy beyond the sphere
178
of marriage, procreation, and family.
The validity of the Court's decision rests upon whether an incompetent patient should possess the same rights regarding medical

decisionmaking as a competent patient. Although recognizing that
a competent person may refuse medical treatment, the Court refused to assign similar protections to an incompetent person. 179
The Court's conclusion is justified because there is no way to pro-

tect an incompetent patient's right to refuse treatment in the absence of the patient's intent other than by resorting to a legal fiction
designed to assess what the incompetent person would have done if
competent.' 8 0 Any constitutional claim arising from the theory of
personal autonomy has no application, therefore, to the incompetent patient.' 8 ' Missouri avoids this legal fiction by establishing a
procedural requirement that an incompetent patient's statements
176. See Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2846-51 (1990) (evaluating history of treatment refusal cases).
177. See id. at 2851 n.7 (citing Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194-95 (1986)) (exhibiting Court's reluctance to take expansive view of its authority to find new fundamental rights);
see also Comment, supra note 5, at 1387-95 (concluding constitutional right of privacy does not
protect patient's right to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment).
178. See supra notes 18-22 and accompanying text (discussing Court's development of
right of privacy and noting limits of privacy right); see also Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186,
194 (1986) (expressing specific reluctance to discover new fundamental rights within fourteenth amendment due process clause).
179. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2852 (explaining that constitutionally protected right to refuse
life-saving treatment is contingent upon "informed and voluntary choice," however, an incompetent person is incapable of making such a choice).
180. See Taylor, Muddling Through Medicine, Legal Times, Jul. 23, 1990, at S27, col. 1 (discussing "conceptual corner" into which dissent's argument leads). Taylor noted an apparent
inconsistency injustice Stevens' argument that Cruzan no longer had a constitutionally protected interest in life, because she was practically dead, yet her liberty interest in freedom
from unwanted treatment inexplicably survived. Id.
The legal fiction concept is best illustrated by Superintendent of Belchertown State School v.
Saikewicz, which involved an individual who was severely retarded since birth. Superintendent
of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 750-53, 370 N.E.2d 417, 430-32
(1977). Although someone in Saikewicz's condition could never have the capacity to express
any views regarding medical care, the court nonetheless extended the general right to refuse
medical treatment to the mentally incompetent patient. Id. at 745, 370 N.E.2d at 427. The
court applied a substituted judgment analysis designed to give effect to the decision that
would be made by the incompetent if competent; an analogy which, in reality, is clearly impossible. Id. at 750-53, 370 N.E.2d at 430-31. But see In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 380-83, 420
N.E.2d 64, 72-74, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, 274-76 (rejecting judicial self-deception present in
Saikewicz), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981).
181. See Ellman, Cruzan v. Harmon and the Dangerous Claim that Others Can Exercise an Incapacitated Patient's Right to Die, 29 JURIME'RICS J. 389, 394-96 (1989) (questioning the Cruzan
family's constitutional argument).
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concerning the withdrawal or withholding of medical treatment be
proved by clear and convincing evidence.' 8 2 The Supreme Court
correctly resisted the temptation to find that autonomy encompasses
an incompetent patient's right to refuse treatment, thereby avoiding
the judicial self-deception that occurs when a third party exercises
autonomy on behalf of the incompetent patient.18 3 In so doing, the
Court did not preclude all incompetent patients from having their
decisions respected. The Court merely concluded that Cruzan's
prior statements did not meet the standard established by Missouri
to protect its interest in preserving life, and that, as applied, the
standard was constitutional.
2.

What is left of substitutedjudgment?

The substituted judgment approach has been applied to encompass treatment decisions on behalf of incompetent patients. 8 4 The
Supreme Court, however, did not accept the premise that Missouri
must accede to the substituted judgment of close family members in
the absence of substantial proof that the family members' decisions
reflect the views of the patient. 18 5 The Court correctly stated that
the due process clause places the decision to terminate treatment
solely with the patient. 186 The majority, however, found no assurance that the views of close family members would be the same as
those of the patient had the patient made a treatment decision while
competent.' 8 7 A more appropriate alternative would require courts
to adopt a presumption in favor of family choice and to place the
burden of showing the unreasonableness of the family decision
18 8
upon the attending physician.
182. See Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. at 2841, 2852 (1990) (holding
federal Constitution does not bar establishment of clear and convincing standard as
safeguard).
183.

See Bradley, Does Autonomy Require Informed and Specific Refusal of Life-Sustaining Treat-

ment?, 5 IssuEs L. & MED. 301, 304 (1989) (stating autonomy often used as legal fiction to
shield from view true bases of courts' decisions). For example, courts attempt to transform a
decision by a surrogate to end the life of the patient into an exercise of the patient's autonomy. Id at 305; see Ellman, supra note 181, at 396-99 (arguing courts should avoid legal fiction that others are actually vindicating patient's own rights when they decide to terminate
treatment for patient). Professor ElIman asserts that the interests of incompetent patients are
actually threatened, not advanced, when others are given a constitutional right to decide on
the incompetent patient's care. Id; see also Johnson, supra note 14, at 708-09 (noting inherent
limitations of applying self-determination or autonomy as model for medical treatment decisionmaking for incompetent patients).
184. See supra notes 38-98 and accompanying text (reviewing substituted judgment approach as applied by New Jersey Supreme Court); supra notes 115, 117 (listing statutes
designed to effectuate surrogate decisionmaking for incompetent patients).
185. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2855-56.
186. Id. at 2855.
187. Id. at 2856.
188. See Rhoden, supra note 97, at 437-45 (advocating strong case for family discretion).
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In her concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor sought to clarify the
Court's position concerning substituted judgment. Justice
O'Connor emphasized that the Court did not foreclose a later determination that the due process clause compels a state to give effect to
the decisions of a substitute decisionmaker. i8 9 Her opinion emphasizes the limited scope of the Court's decision and clearly addresses
the need for further legislative action to ensure that surrogate decisions for the incompetent patient are allowed and followed.
B.

What the Cruzan Decision Did Not Do

First, the Court did not eliminate the "right to die." Cruzan
presented the Court with an incompetent patient who had not left
clear and convincing evidence establishing her intent to terminate
treatment.1 90 Many state legislatures may reach, or have already
reached, a different conclusion than Missouri, and may support an
incompetent patient's right to refuse medical treatment.19 1 Cruzan
does not eliminate a more expansive right to die in these other
states. Nor does the decision prevent other states from applying a
lower standard of proof to determine a patient's intent or merely
192
deferring to the decisions of close family members.
Second, the Court did not distinguish between administered nutrition and hydration and other life-sustaining measures such as artificial respiration.19 3 The Missouri Supreme Court previously found
a moral and legal difference between care provided by artificial hy189. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2857 (O'Connor, J., concurring); see id. at 2856 n.12 (providing
that Court did not address issue of whether state must defer to surrogate decisionmaker if
probative evidence established patient's desire to terminate treatment).
190. See id. at 2855 (finding Missouri Supreme Court did not commit constitutional error
in reaching this conclusion).
191. See generally Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 412 n.4 (Mo. 1988) (en banc) (citing
more than 50 cases that have nearly unanimously ruled in favor of incompetent patient's constitutional right to refuse various forms of medical treatment), aff'd, Cruzan v. Director, Mo.
Dep't of Health, I10 S. Ct. 2841 (1990).
192. See Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2859 (1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating Court
has decided only that Missouri's practice does not violate the Constitution, and more challenging task of crafting appropriate procedures for safeguarding incompetent patients' liberty
interests is entrusted to laboratory of states); see also Kamisar, The Cruzan Case Is Not the Last
Word: Critics Exaggerate in Charging That the Supreme Court Eliminated "Right to Die", Newsday,
June 28, 1990, at 71 (discussing Cruzan critics' overly broad interpretations of opinion); Johnson, supra note 14, at 697-708 (advocating impact of Cruzan may be limited, and assessing
potential impact by confining applicability of case to its facts).
193. See Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2857 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (finding liberty guaranteed
by due process clause protects individual's decision to reject medical treatment, including
artificial delivery of food and water); id. at 2866-67 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (agreeing with
Justice O'Connor's conclusion that artificial delivery of nutrition and hydration is medical
treatment); see also LEGAL FRONTIERS, supra note 1, at 38-45 (positing withdrawal or withholding of nutrition is medical procedure). But see Bopp, Nutrition and Hydrationfor Patients: The
ConstitutionalAspects, 4 IssUsS L. & MED. 3, 15-30 (1988) (suggesting duties of physician and
constitutional rights of patient may prohibit denial of nutrition and hydration).
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dration and nutrition and other medical care. 19 4 Although this distinction was not at issue in Cruzan, the Supreme Court's remarks
regarding nutrition and hydration as indistinguishable from other
forms of treatment may deter the passage of legislation maintaining
such a distinction. 195
Finally, Cruzan does not prevent incompetent patients who have
expressed their intent in advance from having their constitutionally
protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment
enforced. 196 The Court's conclusion in Cruzan, however, should
alert state legislatures that standards enumerated in their own statutes must be reevaluated and, if necessary, amended to protect the
interests of incompetent patients who may not have provided clear
expressions of their decisions regarding medical care.
Justice Stevens, in his dissent, insisted that the majority's conclusions should have compelled the Court to require that Cruzan's
caretaker respect her own best interests.' 9 7 He articulated two cogent arguments. First, no basis existed for the state to insist upon
continued treatment if Cruzan had no interest in continued treatment. The termination of her treatment had no impact on third parties, and there was no reason to doubt the good faith of her
guardians.' 9 8 Second, the best interests of the individual, especially
194. See Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408,423-24 (Mo. 1988) (en banc) (weighing conflicting arguments on distinguishing artificial hydration and nutrition from other life-sustaining measures), aft'd, Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S.Ct. 2841 (1990).
195. See Coyle, Is the Court Avoiding the Big Question?, Nat'l LJ.,July 9, 1990, at 24, col. 4
(discussing how Cruzan decision bolstered position of right to die advocates by equating artificial nutrition and hydration with other forms of medical treatment). The Court did not specifically strike down the portion of the Missouri statute which distinguishes artificial nutrition
and hydration from other "death-prolonging" procedures. See Mo. ANN. STAT. § 459.010
(Vernon Supp. 1990) (maintaining distinction). It is unclear how the Court would rule on this
question. See Belkin, States Are a Patchwork Of Life-and-Death Laws, N.Y. Times, June 26, 1990,

at A19, col. I (analyzing state-to-state differences on types of treatment which may be terminated); see also Fluery, Cruzan Ruling To Shape N.J. Living Will Ban, 126 NJ.L.J. 3, 3 (July 5,

1990) (suggesting Supreme Court's ruling in Cruzan may provide legal ground for dropping
distinction between providing intravenous fluids and nutrition from other medical procedures
under NewJersey law).
196. See supra notes 101-17 and accompanying text (discussing legislation designed to
protect incompetent patients' interests by respecting prior directives of patient).
197. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2879 (1990) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). Justice Stevens argued that the Court ironically permitted the state's abstract
interest in the preservation of life to overwhelm the best interests of Cruzan. Id. (Steven, J.,
dissenting). He insisted that the majority's findings: that a competent individual's decision to
refuse life-sustaining treatment is a protected liberty interest, id. at 2851-52; that upon a
proper evidentiary showing, a duly appointed guardian may exercise such decisions on behalf
of an incompetent ward, idat 2854-55; and that in resolving this tragic case the Court must
"not... attempt, by any general statement, to cover every possible phase of the subject, id. at
2851 (citing Twin City Bank v. Nebeker, 167 U.S. 196, 202 (1897)), mandated that Nancy
Cruzan's liberty to refuse treatment be evaluated in light of her particular circumstances. Id.
at 2879 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
198. Id. at 2880-81, 2891 (Stevens, J.,dissenting); see id. at 2870 (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(positing that state's general interest in life must accede to Cruzan's particularized and in-
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when supported by the interests of all other parties involved, should
prevail over a general state policy that ignores those interests.' 9 9
This alternative approach, if applied in Cruzan's case, would have
allowed her family to exercise the deeply personal decision to terminate her artificial nutrition and hydration.
C.

Post-CruzanDevelopments

In In re Estate of Greenspan,200 the first state high court ruling on the
controversial right-to-die issue after Cruzan, the Illinois Supreme
Court held that food and water may be withheld from terminally ill
patients as long as certain medical and legal requirements are
met. 20 1 The medical requirements are that the incompetent patient's attending physician and at least two other consulting physicians diagnose the patient as terminally ill and irreversibly
comatose. The legal requirements are that, in the absence of an
overriding state interest, the court receive clear and convincing evidence of what the incompetent would have decided if competent.
The court explained that the testimony of doctors, family members,
coworkers, and clergy would be sufficient evidence to establish that
the incompetent patient's "decision" would have been to withdraw
medical treatment. 20 2 On remand, the trial court found that the
tense interest in self-determination in her choice of medical treatment). The state has nothing
to be gained by superceding her decision. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also supra note 81
(finding general interests of state should be balanced against individual's right to refuse
treatment).
199. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2889 (Stevens,J., dissenting). The majority erred, according to
Stevens, by resolving Cruzan's case in the abstract. See id. (StevensJ., dissenting) (proposing
that Nancy Cruzan's protected liberty interest must be understood in light of facts and circumstances particular to her).
200. 137 Ill. 2d 1, 558 N.E.2d 1194 (1990).
201. See In re Estate of Greenspan, 137 Ill. 2d 1, 17-18, 558 N.E.2d 1194, 1202 (1990)
(approving application of substituted judgment theory if plaintiff establishes clear and convincing evidence of patient's intent to withdraw nutrition and hydration).
202. See id. at 4-10, 558 N.E.2d at 1196-98 (evaluating evidence on record). The Illinois
court reiterated that:
pending any constitutionally permissible modification of the common law by the legislature, a surrogate can exercise the right for an incompetent only if:
(1) the incompetent is terminally ill... i.e., the patient's condition is incurable and
irreversible so that death is imminent and the application of death-delaying procedures serves only to prolong the dying process;
(2) the incompetent has been diagnosed as irreversibly comatose or in a persistent
vegetative state;
(3) the incompetent's attending physician and at least two other consulting physicians have concurred in the diagnosis;
(4) the incompetent's right outweighs any interest of the State, as it normally does;
(5) it is ascertained, by an appropriate means--e.g., by the procedure of substituted judgment on the basis of clear and convincing evidence... what the incompetent presumably would have decided, if competent, in the circumstances; and
(6) a court enters an order allowing the surrogate to exercise the incompetent's
right to refuse the treatment.
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family had presented clear and convincing evidence that Sidney
Greenspan would have refused life-sustaining treatment, if he were
able, and permitted removal of the feeding tube. 20 3 The Illinois
court's ruling was consistent with the United States Supreme
Court's holding in Cruzan that the decision to terminate medical
care may be made contingent upon such a showing.
V.

RECOMMENDATIONS

In Cruzan, the United States Supreme Court refused to create a
fundamental constitutional right to die. 20 4 Presumably, this refusal
has alerted legislatures to the significant state-to-state differences
between the types of treatment that may be discontinued and those
that may not, and under what conditions an incompetent patient
may have medical care withheld or withdrawn. 20 5 The following
proposals incorporate the substituted judgment theory, the best interest standards, and portions of the URTIA to meet the needs of
incompetent patients. Alone, each approach fails to provide a fair
process to protect the rights of the incompetent patient. Together,
they provide a framework of uniform requirements that ensure a fair
and practical means of protecting the liberty interest of individuals
to refuse unwanted medical care. Legislatures should adopt statutory provisions that fulfill the objective of the following proposals.
First, a competent person is presumed to have a constitutionally
Ia at 16, 558 N.E.2d at 1201 (citing In re Estate of Longeway, 133 Il1. 2d 33, 47-53, 549
N.E.2d 292, 298-301 (1989) (granting guardian of incompetent patient in irreversible coma
right to refuse artificial nutrition and hydration on behalf of patient)).
203. In re Estate of Greenspan, No. 67903 (Oct. 3, 1990) (unreported opinion).
204. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2852 (1990) (shifting focus
away from "right to die" issue by conceding United States Constitution would grant competent individuals "a constitutionally protected right to refuse lifesaving hydration and nutrition"). The Court avoided the right to die issue by focusing on the constitutionality of
Missouri's clear and convincing evidence standard required to terminate life-sustaining treatment of an incompetent patient. Id. at 2852-55. Justice Scalia, in his concurring opinion,
forcefully articulated a desire to avoid the right to die issue. Id. at 2859-63 (Scalia,J., concurring). Justice Scalia maintains that:
the federal courts have no business in this field; that American law has always accorded the State the power to prevent, by force if necessary, suicide-including suicide by refusing to take appropriate measures necessary to preserve one's life; that
the point at which life becomes 'worthless,' and the point at which the means necessary to preserve it become 'extraordinary' or 'inappropriate,' are neither set forth in
the Constitution nor known to the nine Justices of this Court any better than they are
known to nine people picked at random.., it is up to the citizens... to decide,
through their elected representatives, whether [the decision to refuse life-sustaining
treatment] will be honored.
Id. at 2859 (ScaliaJ., concurring); see Mayo, supra note 6, at 151-55 (arguing that no such right
should be recognized under federal constitutional law and opting instead for continued state
sovereignty over issue).
205. See Belkin, supra note 195, at A19, col. I (discussing regulations regarding termination of medical treatment).
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protected right to refuse life-prolonging treatment.2 0 6
Second, a person adjudged to be incompetent should be provided
a surrogate decisionmaker who will make the final decision on the
patient's behalf. Any prior designation of a surrogate by that individual, made while competent and by way of a living will, durable
power of attorney, or other means designated by the state, should
20 7
be given effect.

Third, to protect the interests of the incompetent patient, the surrogate decisionmaker should apply the following standards to best
reflect the individualized treatment decisions required by the patient's particular circumstances:
If the patient leaves evidence, either by means of a living will,
durable power of attorney, or other verifiable source sufficient to
establish what the patient would have chosen if competent, the
individual's wishes should be given effect under the substituted
20 8
judgment theory.
If the patient has not provided sufficient evidence regarding intent as to medical care, the health care decision should be based
on the patient's best interest. 20 9 This determination should consider the patient's family, friends, moral and religious values,
206. Both the common law right of self-determination and autonomous choice and the
Supreme Court's recent conclusion that this interest is protected under the fourteenth
amendment support this right to refuse treatment. See Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of
Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2851-52 (1990) (recognizing right to refuse treatment); In re Conroy,
98 N.J. 321, 355, 486 A.2d 1209, 1226 (1985) (holding competent adults have right to refuse
any medical treatment, including life-sustaining treatment, regardless of age, medical condition, or prognosis); see also supra note 3 (citing cases recognizing competent individual's right
to refuse unwanted medical treatment).
The procedures of the New Jersey Supreme Court in In re Farrell may be applied to ensure
that individuals are competent and informed of their prognosis, any alternative treatments,
and the risks involved, and to determine that the choice was voluntary and not coerced. See
supra notes 76-82 and accompanying text (outlining procedures applicable to competent patient seeking to terminate treatment). This procedure involves an assessment of the individual's competency and the voluntariness of the decision by two non-attending physicians. In re
Farrell, 108 NJ. 335, 354-56, 529 A.2d 404, 413-15 (1987).
207. See supra notes 10 1-17 and accompanying text (setting forth basic guidelines for surrogate decisionmaking under URTIA, living wills, and other health care proxies); see also supra
notes 96-97 and accompanying text (summarizing how courts apply substituted judgment to
surrogate decisionmaking).
208. Evaluation of the sufficiency of evidence from other verifiable sources may be made
under a clear and convincing standard, or any lesser standard designed to ensure that the
evidence actually reflects the incompetent patient's intent. See supra notes 23-37, 141-47 and
accompanying text (discussing application of clear and convincing standard in Storar,
O'Connor,and Cruzan); see also supra note 63 (elaborating on evidence sufficient to verify intent
of incompetent patient).
209. See supra notes 65-70, 72-73 and accompanying text (discussing best interest approach in Conroy); see also Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2879,
2883, 2889 (1990) (Stevens,J., dissenting) (advocating procedure that requires general state
interest in life to accede to particularized best interests of incompetent); Cantor, Conroy, Best
Interests, and the Handling of Dying Patients, 37 RUTGERs L. REv. 543, 570-77 (1985) (advocating
best interests standard to protect incompetent patients' rights).
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medical prognosis, and any other factors relevant to the particular
2 10
patient's set of circumstances.
Fourth, in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, the health care decisions of a close family member should be
21
presumed to have been made in good faith. '
Fifth, these standards apply to all life-sustaining treatment, including any medical procedure or intervention which, when adminis21 2
tered to a patient, serves to prolong the process of dying.
Sixth, by implementing the decision of a substitute decisionmaker
on behalf of the incompetent patient, the physician or other health
care provider should not be subject to civil or criminal liability, provided this action is in accord with reasonable medical standards and
213
professional judgment.
These proposals incorporate standards enumerated in many state
court decisions, prevailing state legislation, and the Supreme
Court's decision in Cruzan. They attempt to minimize judicial involvement in difficult, personal decisions to withdraw or withhold
medical treatment. The proposals do not seek to be exhaustive, but
offer a more reasonable method of evaluating an incompetent pa210. See In reJobes, 108 N.J. 394,414-15, 529 A.2d 434,444 (1987) (suggesting approach
intended to ensure surrogate decisionmaker effectuates decision incompetent would make if
competent). This broad approach attempts to answer Justice Brennan's argument in Cruzan
that Missouri's heightened evidentiary standard tends to exclude relevant evidence. See
Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2872-73 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that clear and convincing standard blocks exercise of fundamental right).
211. See Rhoden, supra note 97, at 439-45 (advocating scheme favoring family decisions
on behalf of incompetent and suggesting procedures to prevent abuse); see also In re Farrell,
108 NJ. 335, 355, 529 A.2d 404, 414 (1987) (arguing in favor of family involvement in medical decisionmaking for incompetent relative); In re Jobes, 108 NJ. 394, 416, 529 A.2d 434,
445 (1987) (concluding family members are best qualified to make substituted judgment for
incompetent relative); Areen, The Legal Status of Consent Obtainedfrom Familiesof Adult Patients to
Withhold or Withdraw Treatment, 258 J. A.M.A. 229, 234 (1987) (suggesting that protection of
incompetent patients from ignorant or bad faith decisions should be provided institutionally,
using courts only as last resort); Comment, The Role of the Family in Medical Decisionmakingfor
Incompetent Adult Patients: A HistoricalPerspective and Case Analysis, 48 U. Prrr. L. REV. 539, 618
(1987) (positing that ethics committee within health care institution offers reasonable solution
to protect against possible abuses of private decisionmaking for incompetent patients); supra
note 97 and accompanying text (examining family decisionmaking approach in In reJobes).
212. This definition is adopted primarily from the URTIA. URTIA § 1(4), 9B U.L.A. 68,
68 (Supp. 1990). The proposal follows the conclusion of the Supreme Court that no distinction should be maintained between artificial nutrition and hydration and other forms of medical treatment. See Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2852 (equating nutrition and hydration with
administration of medical treatment); id. at 2857 (O'Connor,J., concurring) (discussing medical consensus rejecting any such distinction); id. at 2866-67 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (relating
same); see also J. MURPHY, supra note 107, ch. 20, § C4(b) (adding no legal distinction exists
between withholding or withdrawing treatment); Johnson, supra note 14, at 698-704 (stating
consensus among policy organizations, professional medical associations, and courts is that
provision of nutrition and hydration does not differ from other forms of medical treatment).
213. See URTIA §§ 9(a)-(b), at 78 (providing immunities for persons acting in accordance
with URTIA); see alsoJ. MURPHY, supra note 107, ch. 20, § G2(b) (dispelling misconception that
health care providers are likely to face civil litigation).
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tient's circumstances as a whole so that the incompetent patient
may, under appropriate circumstances, be granted the right to die.
CONCLUSION

In Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, the Supreme
Court upheld Missouri's requirement that an incompetent patient's
intent to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment be proved by clear
and convincing evidence. 21 4 The Court's ruling allowed the state of
Missouri to sustain Nancy Cruzan's life because her family did not
present clear and convincing evidence that she would have wanted
treatment stopped. 21 5 This decision represents a defeat, not only
for Nancy Cruzan and her family, but for all other individuals and
families in the same unfortunate situation. Although the Court correctly found no constitutionally protected, fundamental right to die,
the decision to terminate treatment for a loved one remains one of
the most personal and private decisions a family member must
make. 21 6 The Court's conclusion in Cruzan mandates that legislatures reevaluate existing statutes and enact comprehensive legislation that respects these decisions and protects the rights of
incompetent individuals.
POSTSCRIPT

On December 14, 1990, aJasper County probate judge ruled that
Nancy Cruzan's parents had presented clear and convincing evidence of their daughter's intent during a second hearing five
months after the United States Supreme Court's decision. 2 17 Her
feeding tube was removed the next day, and on December 26, 1990,
214. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2852-55 (reasoning that Missouri's interest in safeguarding decision to refuse life-sustaining treatment is legitimately protected by imposition of heightened

evidentiary requirements).
215. Id. at 2255 (reasoning that as states have prerogative to employ either substituted
judgment or clear and convincing evidence standard, Missouri was not erroneous in reaching
conclusion it did).
216. See Gibbs, Love and Let Die; In an Era of Untamed Medical Technology, How Are Patientsand
Familiesto Decide Whether to Halt Treatment-orEven to Help Death Along?, TME, Mar. 19, 1990, at
62 (documenting emotional, moral, ethical, legal, and theological considerations involved in
making life-concluding decisions for family members). The tragedy associated with this kind
of decision is unimaginable. Peter Busalacchi, the father of a young woman lying in the same
Missouri rehabilitation center as young Nancy Cruzan, likens the ordeal to a "34-month funeral... [m]aybe it would have been best if she had died that night .. " Id.
217. Cruzan v. Mouton, No. CV384-9P (Dec. 14, 1990). The State of Missouri, which had
originally opposed the removal of Cruzan's feeding tube, was dropped as a defendant on
October 23, 1990, after Missouri Attorney General William Webster declared the state no
longer possessed a legal interest in the case. Malcolm,Judge Allows Feeding-Tube Removal, N.Y.
Times, Dec. 15, 1990, at AI0, col. 1; see Gladwell, Court Rules Woman Has Right to Die, Wash.
Post, Dec. 15, 1990, at AI, col. I (noting that legal and ethical observers considered decision
inevitable).
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Nancy Cruzan found peace through death. 2 18 Nearly eight years after her fateful accident and after three years of litigation, the
Cruzans' ordeal ended. Nevertheless, the resolution of their case
does not begin to clarify sufficiently the legal standards required to
219
terminate life-sustaining treatment for incompetent individuals.
Hopefully, each state legislature will establish clear guidelines to
protect not only those who have provided clear and convincing evidence of their medical treatment decisions, but also those who have
2 20

not.

218. See Gladwell, supra note 217, at A3, col. 1 (relating key events and developments
throughout Cruzan's legal battle).
219. See Malcolm, supra note 217, at A10, col. 1. The story quoted Arthur Caplan, director
of the Center for Biomedical Ethics at the University of Minnesota. Caplan asserted that "the
legislatures need to clarify our social policies so that future families and their delicate decisions are not left to the whim of a county prosecutor somewhere." Id.
220. The Missouri legislature stands poised to wage a new debate over the right to die.
Wash. Post, Dec. 30, 1990, at A3, col. 5. State Senator Robert Johnson plans to sponsor a
"health care surrogate bill" which would allow designation of a health care proxy to make
decisions when a person becomes incapacitated. Id. Johnson failed to get similar legislation
passed last session. Id.

